Animal-less Burgers

In my forthcoming book, Unnaturally Delicious, I've got a chapter on the promises and challenges of efforts underway to produce lab-grown meat.  My chapter focuses mainly on the efforts of a Dutch scientists, Mark Post.

This article in Tech Crunch discusses related efforts by a different group of scientists and investors.  

“Impossible Foods, a four-year-old, Redwood City, Ca.-based company at work on a new generation of meats and cheeses made entirely from plants, has raised $108 million in new funding from a powerful group of backers.

Investors in the round, which was led by UBS, include Viking Global Investors and earlier backers Khosla Ventures; Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates; and Horizons Ventures, which invests on behalf of Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing.”

Those are some heavy hitters.  It will be interesting to see where it all goes.

Ethics of Meat Eating

About a month ago, Nathanael Johnson wrote a piece for Grist asking: Is there a moral case for meat?  In the piece, he writes: 

“The arguments against eating animals are pretty convincing. But surely, I thought, there were also intellectuals making convincing counterarguments. Right? Nope. Not really.”

His sentiment reflects a common theme, it seems, in writing about animal welfare and vegetarianism.  In fact, back in 2012, the New York Times ran a contest for people to write essays justifying that it is ethical to eat meat.  The premise was essentially the same as that put forth by Johnson:

“those who love meat have had surprisingly little to say. . . few have tried to answer the fundamental ethical issue: Whether it is right to eat animals in the first place . . .”

A blog post for the New York Times by Bob Fischer and James McWilliams earlier this week attempts to adjudicate between competing factions within the vegetarian/vegan movement.  In the nearly 1000 comments on the post, again and again, crops up the same premise mentioned above: that there is no intellectually sound ethical case for eating meat. 

Ultimately, however, I think this premise is wrong.  There are many intellectually sound, internally consistent arguments for eating meat.  I think what many of these people are saying is "well, I'm not convinced by those arguments."  But, that's not the same thing as saying such arguments are non-existent or bereft of intellectual punch.  I will be the first to admit that there are a number of well written, internally-consistent philosophical discourses that make a compelling case against eating meat. But, that doesn't imply there aren't good counter arguments on the flip side.   

A first place to start would be with the winner (and runners up) of the aforementioned New York Times Essay Contest.  

I also suggest a chapter by the Judge Richard Posner in the book Animal Rights edited by Sunstein and Nussbaum.  

Another good place to turn would be this intelligence squared debate, where four invited guests debate the motion: don't eat anything with a face.  Chris Masterjohn and Joel Salatin make the case against the motion.  After the debate, the audience was just about split between the for and against side (also note that 95% of Americans routinely eat things that had faces).  Now, you may not agree with Masterjohn and Salatin's arguments, but are you comfortable calling 43% of the audience in New York City at the debate (and 95% of the consuming public) illogical, unthinking, or immoral? 

Personally, I've written a number of pieces that attempt to grapple with this issue.  I'll share several of them below.  I'm not saying I fully endorse any of the positions, but I think they provide a flavor for how one might go about tackling the issue.

Attempt 1 (the Utilitarian case; written with Bailey Norwood a couple years ago).

“Who is more ethical: a vegan whose diet prohibits the existence of suffering animals or an omnivore whose desire for meat brings into existence happy animals? Vegans have gained the moral high ground by pointing out that their choices prevent the existence of suffering animals, but seldom do we realize that their actions also prevent the lives of what would be happy animals. Making the world a better place involves more than just preventing the bad. It also means promoting the good.

An ethical justification for meat-eating must ultimately revolve around the actual outcomes experienced by animals—something too often forgotten when a dietary choice becomes a salient part of one’s identity. We can all agree that a sad animal is less preferred than a happy animal, and that two sad animals are less preferred than one sad animal. That is why vegans tout the absence of meat in their diet. Some farm animals live unpleasant lives and the less meat consumed, the less misery the world contains.

However, if we accept this premise, we must also agree that it is better for a happy animal to exist than no animal at all, and that two happy animals are better than one happy animal. While it is certainly true that many animals (farmed and wild alike) live miserable lives, it is also true that many farm animals experience more positive than negative emotions throughout life. Beef cattle, for instance, live most their lives with ample food, protected from predators, and in natural, comfortable habitats. In such cases, it is in the animals’ best interest that they live, and because livestock producers do not raise millions of cows as pets, these happy animals will only live if farmers are paid to raise them—paid by omnivores.

An omnivorous diet that includes food derived from happy animals—and only happy animals—is ethical because it brings into existence animals who live in merriment and precludes the existence of animals who would live in misery.


The ethics of meat eating are more vividly seen by imagining the reality of animal abolition. Attempts to ethically equate ownership of livestock and ownership of human slaves are shaky because the abolition of human slaves and livestock entail vastly different outcomes. Humans can care for themselves. Yet if livestock ownership ceased, we would not witness freedom-loving cows but the near extinction of a species. Farm animals are raised for profit. Animal abolition eliminates the possibility of profit, and implies that many millions of animals will not come into existence. So long as we believe two happy animals are better than one, and one happy animal is better than no animal, animal abolition is unethical.


It would be wrong to categorically assert that meat-eating is ethical. So too would it be wrong to universally claim veganism is the pinnacle of ethical eating. Meat comes from some animals who lead pleasant lives and some who did not. A diet is made ethical when it creates greater happiness, and the only way to effectively ensure that more happy cows exist is to buy meat from farmers who treat their animals well, and to refuse meat from farmers who do not. Instead of asking ourselves whether we should eat meat or go vegan, we should be asking which type of happy animal we will eat today.
”

Attempt 2: (The Exchange argument; also with Norwood in chapter 6 of our book Compassion by the Pound)

“One of the difficulties many people have with utilitarianism is that it can easily justify things like “steeling from the rich to give to the poor.” Many libertarian-minded individuals espouse a ethical and moral rules along the following: i) Each man is an end unto himself, ii) each man determines his own happiness, and iii) each man is entitled to their own life and to the results of their labor, and no other man may infringe upon those without consent. Under this line of thinking, an action between people is moral if it results from an un-coerced, mutually agreed upon exchange. Alas, the cognitive capacities of the hog prohibit a definitive answer to whether they are willing to engage in a voluntary exchange, but as we must do with much of philosophy, we might assume – on the animals’ behalf – whether they would willingly enter an exchange.

Pet owners engage in exchange with their dog. The dog is provided with comfortable housing, ample food, nightly walks, and ample medical care. What does the dog give in return? Companionship and entertainment. A pet owner and his dog engage in mutually beneficial and voluntary exchanges that enhance both lives. What about a pig? The pig is provided shelter, food, water, comfortable temperature, and protection from predators. What does a human get in return? Ultimately, the pig’s life – its meat. But, wait a minute – this is hardly a voluntary exchange – did the hog engage in a trade that was of its own free will of its own consent? Hard to say. The hog owed its very existence to the fact that people want to eat pork. Is the hog willing to trade a short and uneventful existence for the sake of life itself? Would the hog trade ample food and shelter and a certain but short life in the factory farm for the random and capricious conditions of the wild? We can never know for sure, but under certain conditions, we might presume that the hog is indeed willing – that if they could say, they would chose life in a factory farm to no life at all, and that they exchange this meager existence in return for their meat.

No doubt an animal rights proponent would argue that the presumption is invalid, but the activist is simply exchanging one presumption for another: that the hog would rather willingly never exist than live on a factory farm. Both positions are based on presumptions that cannot be validated. But, the truth is this: farm animals can never be placed in a situation where their lives are solely determined by their own actions – their lives are invariably affected by the decisions of humans. Dealing with farm animals will always entail some degree of paternalism and presumption about what is in their interest.”

Attempt 3: (The stewardship argument leading to religious argument; also with Norwood in chapter 6 of our book Compassion by the Pound)

“As we have noted, some animal rights groups are even opposed to owning animals as pets. They only want animals to exist in a wild state, but nature imposes its own distinct forms of cruelty. Wild animals, though adapted to their environment, face many obstacles to receiving adequate nutrition, and most face constant pursuit as prey. In our assessment, wild animals do not generally have a high level of well-being. . . .

Let us now combine this views – that wild animals suffer – with that of a thinker like Gary Fancione who argues that it is that it is impossible for humans to hold animals as property and for those animals not to suffer. The implication of these two views is that it is undesirable for animals to exist either as wild animals (if you hold our view that wild animals lead mostly miserable lives) or as property. The way to alleviate suffering, therefore, is to destroy institutions of livestock and pet ownership, and then engage in an all-out assault on wildlife. Only when humans remain as the last living creatures will suffering be minimized. Whether it be pigs destined for slaughter or dogs destined for doting, nature’s hand apparently has no choice but to be cruel. But, consider another possibility – one that is quite opposite from the view that humans are the cause of animal suffering and/or must eradicate all wildlife. It is possible that the only way in which animals can enter this world and to experience more happiness than suffering is for them to be under the stewardship of humans.

We end this discussion with a final line of reasoning often used to justify meat eating – Christian theology. Although some might be reluctant to admit it, theology – the rational and systematic inquiry into religious questions – bears much similarity with philosophy. One thing can be sure – neither philosophy nor theology can be classified under the heading of “science,” but this need not imply that neither can impart knowledge.

Many of the animal rights activists take great strides in their writings to ridicule Christian beliefs on the nature of man and animals, but it would be foolish to equate ridicule with some proof of error. Even the most outspoken atheist of our time, Richard Dawkins, admits the possibility (though he sees it as highly unlikely) of the existence of a God. And if a God possibly exists, might he have some preference or intention regarding the relationship between humans and animals? The distain for the Judeo-Christian view by many animal rights activists is, in many ways, rather transparent because belief in such a God undercuts the premise that there is nothing particularly different about humans and animals. Once this premise is undercut, so too is the much of the argument for animal rights.

It is commonplace for animal rights activist to focus on the Judeo-Christian belief that God gave humans dominion over animals. And indeed, they are correct in this assertion. What is often forgotten, however, Judeo-Christian doctrine asserts that not only were humans given dominion over animals, but that humans were also given responsibility for their care. Any careful reading of the Bible makes clear the idea that humans have a moral obligation to care for those things with which they have been entrusted, e.g., see Proverbs 12:10 or Exodus 20:10.

Proponents of animal rights make much of the analogy to slavery. It is instructive, then, to consider the arguments of people like Rodney Stark, who persuasively argues that slavery was ended not by humanist or enlightenment thinking, but by Christians who began to recognize that slavery was inconsistent with the underlying message of Jesus. It is true that some Christian societies might have been callous toward the treatment of animals, but as was the case with slavery, Christianity provides a moral foundation for arguing for improvements in the way we treat animals.

Judeo-Christian beliefs about the relationship between humans and animals can adequately rationalize the position that it is both proper to raise and use animals for human purpose, but that we should be good stewards in so doing. In a rebuttal of Posner’s “humancentric” arguments for our use of animals, Singer rightfully asks, “Why then should humans incur any costs in order to reduce the suffering of farm animals?” A Judeo-Christian answer might be that we should take care of our animals because we have a moral obligation to do so, not because humans are the same as animals, but because they are much more.”

Ultimately, I'm asking for less intellectual dogmatism on the side of some non meat eaters.  After sifting through all the philosophical cases for and against eating meat, here's where Norwood and I wound up:

“we are not naïve enough to believe there is a single system of thought on which all can agree regarding the proper relationship between man and animal. If even the world’s brightest animal welfare philosophers cannot arrive at a single answer as to what we should do with farm animals, it is unrealistic to believe all humans will agree.

. . .

For us to conclude that the animal rights activists are weirdoes is to deny the truth in some of their arguments. Conversely, to conclude the animal rights activists are correct (take your pick which one), while the majority of consumers are wrong, is conclusion we are unwilling to draw. We do not believe ourselves so smart and knowledgeable that we know best how to dictate your choices. ”

Ag Gag Law Struck Down

Compared to other similarly sized sectors of the economy, it seems agriculture often has more political power.  Farmer groups tend to be relatively well organized, and the sector is often mentioned as a textbook case of political action based on "concentrated benefits and diffuse costs."

Sometimes that power is used to increase the size of the pie (e.g., by arguing for freer trade or for more productivity enhancing research) but sometimes the reverse is true (e.g., by arguing for various protectionist or subsidy policies).  Particularly at the state level, agricultural groups can often make some headway in getting what they want because there are often more rural legislators than urban ones.  Because of this, sometimes I wonder whether sometimes they might ask for things that produce a short term benefit they later regret in the longer term?

Case in point.  A number of states have been successful in passing so-called ag-gag laws that essentially prohibit the making or showing of undercover videos on farms.  From the farmer's perspective, it isn't hard to see understand the motivation for such laws.  But, what kind of PR does such a law create for the agricultural sector?  Well, as it turns out, a federal judge's decision to strike down an ag-gag law in Idaho prompted this piece by the New York Times editors.  They write:

“While most Americans enjoy eating meat, it is hard to stomach the often sadistic treatment of factory-farmed cows, pigs and chickens.

Farm operators know this, and they go to great lengths to hide these gruesome images from the public. ”

So, in trying to protect themselves from undercover activists, proponents of the law now created bad publicity for the entire industry (even for producers who weren't video taped and who did no wrong) in one of the largest newspapers in the country.  It is not as if there is no legal recourse for activists who break the law.  As the NYT editors write:

“As for the state’s interest in protecting private property and business, the judge pointed to existing laws against trespass, fraud and defamation, which do not trample free speech.”

In an era where consumers demand greater transparency, the industry probably isn't doing itself any favors by engaging in public actions that make it appear as if there is something to hide.  

Regardless of how one feels about ag-gag laws, it might be useful to consider the consistency of one's stance on such issues.  For example, if you support ag gag laws, do you think it should also be illegal to film planned parenthood employees talking about the sale of aborted fetuses?  Should undercover videos of ACORN employees giving illegal advice be banned?  What about undercover reporting of activities of animal activist groups like PETA?

GMO animals

In the past couple weeks, I've seen several articles on GMO animals.  They are often created using cisgenic techniques or gene editing (i.e., moving genes within a species or "turning off" expression of existing genes), so they may (or may not) be more acceptable to consumers than transgenic GMOs.  That said, the research suggests consumers are much more averse to genetic engineering in animals as compared to plants (for example, here's one recent study we conducted).  

Here's a sampling of the stories and applications mentioned:

Tamar Haspel in National Geographic - mentions bird-flu resistant chicken (well, they're not actually resistant but they don't spread the disease).

David Cyranoski in Nature News - mentions "double muscled" pigs.

Hannah Devlin in the Guardian - mentions pigs resistant to African swine fever (includes a nice graphic).

Kat McGowan in Mother Jones - mentioned polled (or hornless) Holstein cows (bet you didn't know almost all dairy cows currently have to be dehorned), also mentions more heat tolerant cows.

This is an old one but don't forget the larger, faster growing transgenic salmon.

It will be interesting to see how this field develops and how consumers respond.  Reducing proensity for disease and need for dehorning are clear animal welfare improvements, and of course more efficient animals mean less environmental impacts and lower prices.  Will that assuage consumer concerns?  Only time will tell.

Addendum:  Ellen Goddard reminded me of this story on transgenic cows that have higher Omega 3s

Why don't people vote like they shop?

There have been several recent cases where there is an apparent disconnect between the way people vote on food issues and how they shop for food.  Examples include votes on GMO labeling or bans (which are more popular with voters than non-GMO products are with shoppers) and animal welfare issues (voters in several states have banned cages/crates employed in the vast majority of purchased retail products).  The issue is of importance to agricultural producers, who must adopt costly new practices that consumers haven't been fully willing pay a premium for in the marketplace.  

There has been a lot of academic speculations about the causes of this vote-buy gap, but we still aren't sure why it exists.  I'm now working on a research project with Bailey Norwood here at OSU, Kate Brooks at University of Nebraska, and Glynn Tonsor at K-State to delve a bit deeper into the issue.  

In the most recent Food Demand Survey (FooDS), I thought I'd ask every day people why they think the vote-buy gap exists.  Here's the question I asked:

“In 2008, 63% of voters in California voted to ban the use of small cages for egg-laying hens. However, at the time around 90 to 95% of the eggs Californians purchased came from small cages and only 5 to 10% were cage free. So, a majority of voters voted to ban a product that a majority of shoppers routinely bought. Why do you think there is such a gap between how people voted and how they shopped for different types of eggs?”

The question was open-ended and respondents could type anything they wanted in an empty box. 

I went through the answers and tried to categorize them into competing explanations for the gap.  Not all answers were mutually exclusive, so I put some of them in more than one category.  

Here were the common responses (note that 46% of responses responded with some form of "I don't know" or did not provide a cogent response).

The information hypothesis (mentioned by 27% of all respondents and 59% who provided an answer).  The gap is caused by a lack of information: people did not know they were buying cage eggs in the grocery store, and they wouldn't have bought them if they knew more.  Example responses include things like "Because they did not realize what they were purchasing" and "shoppers didn't know that eggs were coming from small caged hens" and "Most people don't understand where their food comes from."

The price hypothesis (mentioned by 14% of all respondents and 29% who provided an answer).  The gap is a result of the high price of cage free eggs in the grocery store: prices are more salient in the store than when voting.  Example responses include "price is everything, people buy what is available at  a cheap price" and "Because people do not have money to pay for more expensive eggs."

The consumer vs. citizen hypothesis (mentioned by 8% of all respondents and 17% who provided an answer).  People have two selves: the citizen who wants to do the "right thing" in the voting booth and the consumer who pays more attention to themselves and prices when shopping.  Example responses include, "sometimes people say what they think is politically correct but don't act in the same manner" and "People voted with their hearts/ethics" and "I don't think they considered how they bought the products.  They voted as they did because they know it is the right thing to do."

The availability hypothesis (mentioned by 5% of all respondents and 11% who provided an answer).  More consumers don't buy cage free eggs because they aren't available (or aren't convenient) in the stores in which they shop.  Example responses include, "cage free are less available and cost more" and "There wasn't many choices available for eggs in the supermarket.  You purchase what you can see" and "Consumers want cruelty free eggs but are frustrated that they aren't available at convenient stores where they already shop."

The apathy hypothesis (mentioned by 4% of all respondents and 9% who provided an answer).  Consumers don't care (or don't think) about animal welfare when shopping, but they might vote for an animal welfare policy when confronted. Examples include, "i don't think they cared much" and "I don't think about it when buying my eggs. I'm sure most people don't think about it."

Selection hypothesis (mentioned by 2% of all respondents and 1% who provided an answer).  A sample of voters is not the same as the sample of shoppers.  The types of people who vote have a stronger preference for  cage free eggs than the population of people who shop.  An example includes, "I think in general people who are passionate about an issue such as animal welfare are more likely to vote and participate in "get out the vote" campaigns to encourage voting. So in elections when many people choose not to vote (or are unable to for economic reasons), it is easier for groups who feel strongly about an issue to pass such bans." 

Induced innovation hypothesis (mentioned by 2% of all responses, and 1% who provided an answer).  People don't buy cage free eggs now because they're too expensive, but voting for the policy will force producers and retailers to price them lower at a point consumers are willing to pay.  An example response includes, "Some cannot afford the higher price eggs, but if all producers were forced to have better living arrangements the prices would then drop."

A number of hypotheses that I often hear mentioned among academics were rarely if ever mentioned by the respondents.  For example, the free riding/public good hypothesis (that even though my individual purchase doesn't much affect animal welfare my vote might matter because more animals are affected) or the commitment hypothesis (I really want to buy cage free eggs but I keep backsliding; a ban can force me to behave as I really want to).  

There were a number of mentions of food safety and health.  It wasn't clear to me precisely how these translated into a vote-buy gap, but I thought it was worth mentioning nonetheless.