Country of Origin Labeling

The WTO recently ruled against the US in the latest dispute over mandatory country of origin labeling (MCOOL).  Their latest ruling cites work I've conducted with Glynn Tosnor, Ted Schroeder, and Mykel Taylor at Kansas State, among others (not necessarily in an uncritical light).

In any event, I was skeptical of the way the US chose to respond to the original finding that they were out of compliance with the WTO, and the latest finding seems to only reinforce those views.

Darren Hudson had a few thoughts on the issue, with which I largely agree: 

“Overall, Lusk and Anderson found that modest increases in total beef demand (2-3%) would offset any producer costs [Lusk note: subsequent research by Taylor and Tonsor have found no demand response to MCOOL]. But are we focused too myopically on U.S. beef/meat? If we step back and truly think about consumers and the functioning of markets, we have a highly integrated North American livestock complex. Does it help the consumer more to be able to identify which cattle are born in the U.S., or to have an efficient, lower cost movement of livestock to production and processing areas with comparative advantage to do those functions? That includes things like harmonized health and safety inspections and transport rules. Does COOL put a wedge between us and our North American partners so that we do not get those benefits simply for the possible benefit that someone out there would buy a rib-eye steak over another because it was born in the U.S.

The COOL ruling gives us a moment to step back and take stock of what is really important in this argument. I know there are those that value the information provided by the label, and I know there are those that are harmed by it. But we need to think big, strategically, and long-term if we are to remain competitive globally.”

Paternalism - Immigration Edition

A lot of policies involve group A trying to pass laws that they perceive to improve group B's well-being.  But, how often do we ask group B what they really want?

This new paper by Grace Melo, Gregory Colson and Octavio Ramirez shows how such paternalism can might lead to policies that group B doesn't actually prefer.

“This study presents evidence from a survey and choice experiment on the preferences of Hispanic immigrants who entered the United States illegally for different immigration reform proposal attributes. Key components of the current competing US Senate and House immigration reform bills are considered including pathways to legal permanent residence, temporary work visas, family visitation rights, and access to medical care. The results quantify the value Hispanic immigrants place on different policy attributes and suggest that longer-term work visas are highly valued. Ability to legally work in the United States and a pathway to citizenship are substantially more valued than social services such as medical care and social security benefits.”

Should the government regulate unhealthy foods?

That was the question asked in a long piece by the Congressional Quarterly Researcher a few days ago.  I had several nice conversations with Robert Kiener, the author of the piece, and was pleased he included a few of my thoughts.  

The article had a page (pg. 833) with alternative viewpoints responding to the question: "should the government tax sugary soda?"  Writing in favor was Michael Jacobson with the Center for Science in the Public Interest.  Writing in opposition was yours truly.  Jacobson repeatedly refers to "big soda's" talking points, but my views are my own and I have no financial ties to the soda or sugar industries.  I began by writing:

“Should the government tax sugared soda? It already does. Farm policies make U.S. sugar prices two to three times higher than elsewhere. Moreover, ethanol policies have led to a more than doubling of the price of high fructose corn syrup since 2005. Its no wonder that per capita sugar consumption has fallen precipitously over the last decade.”

You can read the rest for my other thoughts.  

On the sugar policy issue, I'll note this paper just released by Beghin and Elobeid in the journal Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy on the effects of sugar policy.  They write on the effects of the removal of US sugar policy.  They estimate the removal of the sugar program would lead to a roughly 30% reduction in the US price of refined sugar.  They write: 

“The removal of the sugar program would increase U.S. consumers’ welfare by $2.9 to $3.5 billion each year and generate a modest job creation of 17,000 to 20,000 new jobs in food manufacturing and related industries. Imports of sugar containing products would fall dramatically, especially confectioneries substituting for domestic inputs under the sugar program. Sugar imports would rise substantially to 5–6 million short tons raw sugar equivalent. World sugar price increases would be minor, equivalent to about 1 cent per pound.”

The interesting dichotomy (dare I say, irony) is that the ~$3 billion in consumer benefits estimated from the above study come about because of lower sugar prices that would arise if US sugar policy were eliminated. But, it seems sugar price advocates think just the opposite: rising sugar prices will somehow benefit consumers.  We can't have it both ways.  Either falling sugar prices help or hurt consumers.  I don't know about you, but I prefer paying lower prices.  

On Crop Insurance

The UC Berkeley economist Brian Wright provocatively begins an article in Choices Magazine as follows

“Consider a deal where, for about 200,000 farmers, every dollar they can pay to the government in crop insurance premiums will give them an expected return of $1.90 as J.W. Glauber reported was the case for 1990 to 2011. Imagine that it costs the taxpayers at least $1.10 to get farmers paid that expected a 90-cent profit (Glauber, 2013). Imagine that this deal has just been sweetened further with a new set of giveaways in the legislation that is widely called the 2014 Farm Bill, at the end of a half-decade called the “great recession” when farm families’ wealth has soared to over eight times that of the average American family (Bricker et al., 2012; and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2014). In an ingenious and successful political marketing campaign, farmers continue to promote public support for this deal as crop “insurance.””

Price responsiveness to unhealthy food taxes and healthy food subsidies

I recently ran across this article published in Current Obesity Reports calling for more rigorous methods to assess the effects of soda and fat taxes.  The article makes a number of good points, but it also misses many more complications that should be included for a rigorous evaluation - for example, how do firms respond when subjected to new food policies?

Another example comes to us via this paper in the Journal of Marketing by Debabrata Talukdar  and Charles Lindsey.  If you want to tax unhealthy foods and subsidize healthy ones, the authors suggest regulators may face an up hill battle because consumers are less sensitive to rising prices for unhealthy foods and falling prices for healthy foods than the reverse.

A portion of the abstract:

“The results from multiple studies confirm that consumers exhibit undesirable asymmetric patterns of demand sensitivity to price changes for healthy and unhealthy food. For healthy food, demand sensitivity is greater for a price increase than for a price decrease. For unhealthy food, the opposite holds true. The research further shows that the undesirable patterns are attenuated or magnified for key policy-relevant factors that have been shown to decrease or increase impulsive purchase behavior, respectively. As the rising obesity trend brings American consumers’ food consumption behavior under increased scrutiny, the focal findings hold significant implications for both public policy makers and food marketers. ”

They conclude:

“For public policy makers, our findings imply that the efficacy of economic policy interventions in inducing healthier food consumption behavior will be much more limited than what is expected under the conventional premise of symmetric patterns of demand response. This may warrant that public policy officials lower their level of expectations regarding the effectiveness of so-called sin tax initiatives in curbing demand for unhealthy food.”