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California Animal Welfare Laws Impacts Egg Prices Nationwide

The American Journal of Agricultural Economics just released an interesting new paper entitled “Piecemeal Farm Regulation and the U.S. Commerce Clause” by Colin Carter, Aleks Schaefer, and Daniel Scheitrum. The paper builds off some previous work I’d published with Conner Mullally and Trey Malone about the impacts of California’s animal welfare laws, which require more space for hens, on egg prices. The new paper by Carter, Schaefer, and Scheitrum goes further in answering some important questions. Namely, what impacts have California laws had on consumers and producers in other states?

They write:

The balance between a state’s power to regulate food production within its borders and the impacts of such governance initiatives on consumers and producers in other states is the subject of intense policy debate. The food movement in America has generated piecemeal state laws that—in effect (and possibly by design)—influence how farms in other states operate.

Here’s a summary of their findings.

Our results indicate that the policy had widespread effects across the U.S. In the months following implementation of AB 1437, wholesale egg prices in the Midwest, Northeast, Southeast, and South Central U.S. experienced a dramatic increase. Since then, prices have continued to trade at a 7¢–10¢ premium over their former long‐term equilibrium. AB 1437 has also increased the share of laying hens housed in California‐compliant enclosures across the U.S and led to increased concentration of out‐of‐state firms shipping eggs to California. Between January 2015–December 2017, California hen housing requirements cost U.S. consumers almost $2.7 billion. The majority of these costs ($1.98 billion) were borne out of state.

They also found that California’s laws:

shut many small producers out of the California market and led to more concentrated interstate trade.

Of course, some people really value improvements in animal welfare, and there may be “external benefits” that aren’t captured in market prices and transactions. Another externalities, that this paper reveals is that that Californians are imposing higher egg costs on consumers in other states who didn’t vote in their animal welfare referendum. The authors calculate:

if we evaluate the policy from a U.S.‐wide perspective, the annual per‐capita external value would need to range between $35.61 and $108.57 per capita to be cost effective

On a couple different occasions attorney generals from other states have tried to sue California over these laws based on arguments that they violated the U.S. Interstate Commerce Clause. The suits have failed, as I understand it, not necessarily on the merits of the case per se but because the courts have decided the attorney generals don’t have “standing” to bring the case because they aren’t egg producers. These issues are unlikely to go away. California recently passed new animal welfare standards that go beyond the space requirements for hens and will ultimately require all hens be cage free. California isn’t alone in passing cage free standards, and other states such as Massachusetts and Washington have similar measures being implemented. Moreover, these issues are unlikely to only relate to eggs. GMO labeling standards were going down the same route until a federal policy was ultimately passed. Might we see similar state-by-state regulations on pesticides, labor standards, or preservatives?

Update on Meat and Livestock Markets in the Wake of COVID

Fortunately, it appears the worst of the COVID-related disruptions to meat and livestock markets may be over.

The figure below shows the most recent data on livestock and chicken slaughter (cattle and hogs are daily on weekdays; chickens is weekly). The worst of the disruptions occurred in late April and early May when we were running about 40% below last year, but significant improvements have been made since then. For beef and pork, the plants are mainly back online, but are running at reduced capacity due to social distancing of workers, etc. Beef and pork are currently running at about 10% to 15% below last year. Chicken processing hasn’t deviated more than plus or minus 10% from last year at any point during this period.

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The changes in processing capacity have translated into changes in wholesale prices. Below are wholesale beef, pork, and chicken prices.

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The quantity and price data above can be used to calculate demand indices, which are shown below.

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Here are beef and pork marketing margins (the difference between wholesale meat price and the farm-level livestock price), which I previously discussed here. One of the reasons the pork margin is lower is that it is based on a carcass-weight hog price whereas the beef margin is based on cattle live weight prices.

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Finally, as I previously indicated, all meat isn’t created equal during a pandemic.

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Purdue Food and Agriculture Vulnerability Index

Since the onset of the pandemic, I’ve been working with Ranveer Chandra, Chief Scientist for Microsoft Azure Global, and his team to help conceptualize and convey whether and to what extent COVID19 related illnesses pose a risk to agricultural and food production. Today, we finally have a beta version of our dashboard ready for viewing.

The basic idea is to compare the geographic pattern of COVID cases to the geographic distribution of agricultural workers and agricultural production for particular crops and animals. If there are a large number of COVID cases in a location that grows the vast majority of a particular agricultural crop, then we can infer that production of that crop is at risk. The level of risk is inferred by creating an estimate of the percent of total state or national production of a crop that is potentially lost from COVID illnesses.

As it turns out, for the handful of agricultural commodities we’ve entered in our tool thusfar, the risk is very low (far less than 1% of total production estimated to be at risk). The reasons are straightforward: 1) production of most major agricultural commodities is distributed over a wide geography, and 2) the percent of the population with COVID in rural/agricultural areas remains low.

One of the main purposes of the tool is to help people visualize a portion of our food supply chain, to help people better understand where their food comes from, and to help illustrate that, at least at the moment, COVID pose little risk to the aggregate supply of food in the United States.

There are several ways I hope to expand this tool, should funding emerge and time allow. As we’ve seen, the risks from COVID appear to be less related to agricultural production and more related to food processing. Data on location and distribution of food processing facilities, and numbers of food processing workers employed in each location, is harder to come by but it’s not an impossible task. There are other items we’ll continue to work on to help make the tool more user friendly and functional.

A screenshot of the dashboard is below, but you’ll need to go to the Purdue page to actually use the tool.

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Thanks to Ranveer Chandra, Hope Foley, Riyaz Pishori, Anirudh Badam, Jerry Neal, Stacey Wood, Peeyush Kumar, and Deepak Vasisht from Microsoft and Aaron Walz and Kami Goodwin at Purdue for their help getting this dashboard up and running.

Exploring Polarization in US Food Policy Opinions

That’s the title of a new paper co-authored with Christina Biedny and Trey Malone that is forthcoming in the journal, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. We build off some previous work I’d published trying to measure political ideologies with respect to food to see how attitudes and perspectives have changed over time. Here’s the abstract:

Many maintain that the US political climate has become more charged with partisan beliefs over the past decade, although little is known about whether this partisan divide can be observed in food policy opinions. This article aims to determine whether Democrat and Republican food policy opinions diverged between 2011 and 2018. We find evidence of the contrary; partisan public opinions on food and agriculture policies have actually converged, with both major parties exhibiting a preference toward heightened government intervention. Our results indicate that voters preferring more government intervention in food policies have become more numerous in the Republican Party for issues including animal welfare and affordable food. However, once we include Independents and other third parties in our sample, we find that the variance between food policy opinions has increased for many policies.

Ruminations on Solutions to the COVID-Related Food Disruptions

Throughout this pandemic, there have been many prognostications about the future of eating and proposals to make sure we are better prepared for the future. A common solution that I hear being offered is more direct to consumer, more local, more distributed food supply systems. These ideas have an intuitive appeal and most take it as self evident that these food systems would be more robust and more resilient relative to the status quo. However, I haven’t seen much serious discussion about how these alternative types of food supply chains and systems would have actually performed if faced with the same massive and unexpected shocks witnessed over the past couple months. Buckle in. This is a longish post.

There were two distinct waves and causes to the disruptions in our food sector during the COVID pandemic. The first occurred in mid- to late-March when there was a near shut down in restaurant and food away from home sales and a corresponding spike in demand at grocery stores.

Many of the news stories at the time concerned empty shelves at the grocery store coupled with commodities being dumped or plowed under at the farm. The excess at the farm was primarily a result of the fact that demand for food away from home fell markedly, and the way we deliver food to restaurants is packaged and with machinery that is not easily amenable to delivering food to grocery stores. Moreover, in some cases, there were regulatory barriers that prevented food from moving from the food-away-from home stream to the grocery stream.

A key point here is that the “shock” to the food system was a massive demand shock, with demand destroyed at restaurants along side a big temporary boost in grocery-demand Within a matter of weeks (by early April), the grocery and manufacturing sector had largely work through the massive demand increase and shelves return to near full as groceries sales fell from the near 100% spike to running about 20 to 30% above normal.

What is it about direct to consumer food delivery or farmers markets that would have performed better to these demand shocks? Most of the vegetables that we saw being plowed under were destined for restaurants. Demand at restaurants was destroyed by shutdown orders. This demand destruction would have occurred regardless of whether the supplier to the restaurant was a small and local or whether they were large and distant. The issue wasn’t geographic proximity or scale, rather there was a lack of demand from particular buyers such as restaurants and cafeterias. We seem to notice the farm losses more when it happens on one large farm as opposed to it happening on many small farms.

As indicated, despite the dramatic demand spike, grocery stores were able to quickly work through the disruptions and return to normal within a matter of weeks. Are we really to believe that a supply chain executive for a large supermarket chain would have had an easier and more effective time coordinating with hundreds or thousands of small producers as opposed to a handful of large suppliers?  Would smaller manufacturers have been able to ramp up production as quickly in response to the grocery demand spike? Would public health have been better served by many small trucks entering cities to sell produce rather than a smaller number of large semis?

One thing about agricultural production is that it is seasonal. No farmer, whether small or large, local or distant, can immediately, within the time frame of one or two weeks, produce a new crop. The foods we see on our shelves today are a result of agricultural decisions made many months ago and no system, more or less distributed, is going to change that basic biological fact. Crops were destroyed because the demand we anticipated when planting didn’t materialize. Likewise, we don’t have a food replicator for those commodities we tend to buy in grocery stores, it takes time to grow and manufacture them. Thus, the initial challenge with food supply chain was a mismatch of supply and demand brought about by the fact that we cannot immediately respond to demand shocks because there are biological lags associated with agricultural production.

Isn’t the increase in visits to food banks a condemnation of the current food system? In my assessment, this outcome is a result of general economic conditions such as lost income and unemployment NOT a problem with the food system per se. Yes, it would have been nice to get some of the farm surplus to food banks, but someone still needs to pay to harvest, transport, and process it. It isn’t reasonable to expect farmers (local or distant) to incur these costs while they’re also losing significant income. Maybe it’s a role for government to step in and help fill the void, but again, this issue has little to do with the structure of our food supply chain and much more to do with the the overall economic harm people are suffering from lost income.

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The second major disruption occurred not from a demand shock but rather from a supply shock. In early April, meatpacking plants began closing when workers in the plants contracted COVID19. The meat industry structure is such that there are a small number of very large plants responsible for most of the packing. As such, when any one plant goes down, it’s large enough to have noticeable aggregate impacts in the market.

These observations have lead some folks, including myself, to ask whether a system with a larger number of more medium size plants might not be a more resilient system. One of the reasons COVID19 seems to have heavily affected meat packing is the labor intensive nature of meat packing plants, and the fact that packing plant workers are in a cold, refrigerated environments where air is re-circulated. I appears this environment is particularly conducive to virus spread from worker to worker.

Do we have any evidence that smaller or more medium-size plant wouldn’t have the same sorts of issues with spread of virus from worker-to-worker? All plants, regardless of size, want to control costs. A packing plant requires a large refrigerated building, the cost of which needs to be spread over as many pounds of production as possible. Moreover, when USDA inspectors are required, when there are labs and tests to run, and workers to pay, there is a strong incentive to ensure that a plant can accomplish as much production as possible in as little time as possible. It strikes me that even a more medium sized plant will face the economic incentives to have workers in close proximity (extra square footage in refrigerated atmospheres is very expensive). It’s one reason that I think a more adept solution is automation to reduce reliance on labor.

When we talk about resiliency, somehow people first think of size. But I’m not so sure size is the key in this context; rather, a key characteristic is redundancy. The problem in the current situation is that we have too many animals and not enough room to process them. So, the “fix” is extra capacity in the system.

But, somebody has to pay for that capacity. What we’re essentially asking is for someone to build a multi- million dollar facility and keep it idle for large parts of the week or the year in anticipation of some unexpected future fire, tornado, or pandemic. No company in a competitive environment can withstand the high cost of such idle productive capacity. Even if we could, by government mandate or construction, create new processing plants to create redundant plants in the unlikely event of a fire, tornado, or pandemic, we’d still have to have the ability, in a moment’s instance to ramp up the plant, scale production, hire workers, etc. to pick up the excess from other plants.

There’s also a very strong assumption that there are many communities who want a new packing plant in their backyard. Are there really 100 such communities in the country? Remember the controversy this past fall when Costco wanted to open a new poultry processing plant in rural Nebraska?

Meat packing capacity took a big hit for a couple weeks, but we already appear to be on the rebound (today’s data suggests we are running at about 25% below last year as compared to the 40% reduction we were seeing a week or so ago). Whatever ills result from a small number of very large plants processing most of the livestock in the country, one upside is that we know where the problems are and we have concentrated local, state, local federal efforts (from health authorities to OSHA to USDA) to bring those plants back online as quickly as possible. Would such coordination be as efficient and effective had there instead been hundreds or thousands of small packing plants that were closed down? Again, it strikes me that one of the reasons we’ve focused so much attention on size and scale in meat packing is that it’s so much easier to see when it’s concentrated, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that a more disaggregated system wouldn’t have larger aggregate impacts. That is, we may be suffering from availability bias.

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None of the above discussion is meant to besmirch local foods or more direct-to-consumer markets. All systems involve costs and trade-offs, including our present supply chain. We can and should try to do better. Let’s also make sure we think hard and ensure efforts to improve will actually achieve the outcomes we want.

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P.S. I’ve used the word “food system” in this post for ease of exposition but I strongly agree with Rachel Laudan that, “there is not ‘a’ food system but multiple cris-crossing supply chains, some connected, some not.”