Steinbeck and Farm Policy

Over at Econlog, David Henderson has been blogging recently about the life of the economist John Kenneth Galbraith.  Henderson pointed out that Galbraith (who was often in favor of price controls and help implement them during WWII) knew that FDR's farm policies designed to increase prices consisted of destroying said crops - an act that was certain to hurt those who were starving at the time.  

I was absolutely astounded at John Steinbeck's description of the effects of those farm policies.  Here is what Henderson had to say: 

But if Galbraith's friend, John Steinbeck, was aware of FDR's policies, he never said so. Instead, he attributed the crop destruction policies to farmers rather than the feds.

In The Grapes of Wrath, after describing a scene in which orange growers spray oranges with kerosene to make them inedible, Steinbeck writes:

There is a crime here that goes beyond denunciation. There is a sorrow here that weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success. The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an orange. And coroners must fill in the certificates--died of malnutrition--because the food must rot, must be forced to rot. The people come with nets to fish for potatoes in the river, and the guards hold them back; they come in rattling cars to get the dumped oranges, but the kerosene is sprayed. And they stand still and watch the potatoes float by, listen to the screaming pigs being killed in a ditch and covered with quicklime, watch the mountains of oranges slop down to a putrefying ooze; and in the eyes of the people there is a failure; and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath. In the souls of the people the grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy, growing heavy for the vintage.

Galbraith and Steinbeck were friends. I wonder if Galbraith ever told Steinbeck the truth: the criminal here was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He's the man against whom Steinbeck should have directed his wrath.

What are the impacts of mandatory GMO labeling?

Genetically modified (GM) food products and their labeling have become a major policy issue with impassioned public debates. We explore the impact of different labeling regimes on consumer attitudes towards GM products and consumer welfare. Our experimental results illustrate that these consumer attitudes do not follow the Uniform distribution as has often been assumed in the literature but instead fit an adjusted Kumaraswamy distribution. If a Uniform distribution is assumed, the advantage of mandatory labeling would be exaggerated. Using an adjusted Kumaraswamy distribution our simulation results demonstrate that voluntary labeling is superior to mandatory labeling with the higher separation cost, while mandatory labeling is not necessarily better with lower separation cost. Therefore, the governments of China and other countries with similar consumer characteristics should consider voluntary labeling for GM food while encouraging innovations that reduce the price of GM food as well as controlling the opportunistic behavior of its producers so as to enhance the advantage of voluntary labeling

That's from a paper just published Li Zhao, Haiying Gua, Chengyan Yue, and David Ahlstrom in the journal Food Policy. 

What Do Food Stamp Recipients Buy?

This editorial in the LA Times sounds an "alarm" about our lack of knowledge about how food stamp recipients spend their money:

The debate in Congress  about cutting the food stamp program has sparked predictable clashes between those who want to help the poor and those who want to cut government spending. But strangely missing from the arguments is a shocking fact: The public, including Congress, knows almost nothing about how the program's $80 billion is spent.

The underlying premise of article seems to be a notion that we need to know how food stamp recipients spend their money so we can decide if they are using it wisely.  That is, should purchases of food stamp recipients should be restricted to exclude unhealthy items?  I'm a bit skeptical of the impacts of such policies for reasons I talked about previously:

we have to realize that restricting [food stamp] use may not have the intended effect.  Money is fungible.  If you can't use food stamps to buy sodas, you'll use them to buy more of something else - freeing up money to buy soda.

But, that's not the reason I'm weighing in here.  Coming off a highly successful meeting of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association earlier this week, I was again reminded of the exciting and energetic work being done by my fellow food and agricultural economists.  I can only think that many of them who study food stamp (SNAP) issues would bristle at the statement in the LA Times that: 

SNAP is kept under wraps. And Congress acts blindly, with the House voting to remove SNAP from the farm bill altogether and the Senate proposing to cut $4 billion from the program.

If Congress acts blindly, it is only because they (or their staffers) are unwilling to read the peer-reviewed research.   The fact is that there are large number of studies that, by merging various data sets, have investigated what SNAP recipients eat, how their purchases differ from non-SNAP recipients, and whether SNAP participation causes things like obesity.  

True, we may not have scanner-type data from grocery stories tied to EBT cards, but that is a far stretch from claiming we know nothing or act "blindly". 

Another study raises questions about sweetened beverage taxes

A small group of food and agricultural economists have been quietly releasing research that questions the argument that sweetened beverage taxes will have any meaningful impact on the rates of obesity.  First was a French study showing fat taxes to be quite regressive (i.e., the burden is most heavily paid by the poor) having very small effects on nutritional content.  Then was a UC Davis study showing that the only kind of tax to have much effect on weight would be an across-the-board food or calorie tax.  After that, I discussed a Cornell study showing that sweetened beverage taxes are likely to be far less effective than previously predicted if food taxes are only calculated at the register and not posted on the shelf (as is the case in virtually all US retail outlets).  I then talked about my own research on the issue, pointing out some weaknesses in much of the conceptual reasoning about fat taxes. 

Now, comes this paper just accepted for publication in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics.   The authors find: 

A half-cent per ounce increase in sugar-sweetened beverage prices is predicted to reduce total calories from the 23 foods and beverages but increase sodium and fat intakes as a result of product substitution.

The authors also showed that previous studies, which failed to account for the full substitution effects across foods (an issue we highlighted back in 2008 in this paper), would over-estimate the effectiveness of a sweetened beverage tax.  They also estimate that the consumer welfare losses that results from paying higher prices from a tax are higher among the poorer consumers than the richer consumers.  

Ultimately, the authors predict that a one-half cent tax per once of sweetened beverages would cause

reductions of 0.37 and 0.16 kg/person in 1 year

for low and high income consumers.

Mea culpa - fat tax version

About two years ago, I co-authored a paper that was published in the journal Health Economics  with the title "When Do Fat Taxes Increase Consumer Welfare."  

I started work on that paper because I was troubled by the contradictory way in which economists had approached the analysis of fat taxes.  One the one hand, economists estimated the effects of fat taxes by using elasticities of demand that were derived from a rational consumer-utility maximizing model.  In this kind of conceptual model, a tax (or a price increase) cannot make a consumer better off.  However, on the other hand, economists were publishing these papers with the premise that somehow the tax could make people better off.   In the paper, we tried to think about an approach for reconciling these two stances by asking whether a tax could make people better off if we make the reasonable assumption that people also care about (and consider) weight or health effects when choosing the quantity and type of food to buy.   

We had argued that in this situation, it was possible but empirically unlikely a tax could make people better off.  Enter Professor Neill, who wrote a comment on our work, saying "no" - it is concetually impossible for a fat tax to increase consumers' well-being in a "standard" economic model of the consumer.  Here are the first sentences of our forthcoming response to Dr. Neill:

We are flabbergasted at how such a fundamental lesson of mathematical economics escaped our attention, but Professor Neill is right and we were wrong. We apologize. 

Neill pointed out, embarrassingly to us, what should be obvious to any serious student of economics.  A tax is akin to reducing someone's income.  No one is better off with less income.  Even if one wants to weight less, they don't need a tax to do it.  A consumer can achieve a lower weight at current prices and re-allocate their income toward other non-weight-increasing goods and achieve a higher level of satisfaction.  

So, how do economist justify fat taxes?  One approach is to claim that obesity is an externality - that my food choices impose a cost on you (via Medicare/Medicaid) and thus a tax can force me to properly consider those costs.  However, in a paper a couple years ago, Bhattacharya and Sood dismantled the validity of that argument (although it is not well understood and continues to be debated).  

Another response is that the "rational consumer utility maximization" model is incorrect.  This "behavioral economics" approach posits that people fail to properly account for their future well-being and that a tax can force people to make decisions today that their future selves will ultimately find beneficial.  The precise mechanism for this welfare improvement is rarely laid out with any precision.      

In our reply to Neill, we tried to sketch out a behavioral-economics type model to see when a fat tax might be justified on those grounds.  Here is our conclusion:

under this sort of behavioral economics framework, where people naively or myopically optimize utility without considering future weight effects, it is possible to imagine situations where raising prices might increase ultimate experienced welfare. However, this condition occurs only when price is very high and falls in the range where consumption would take place only because people are ignoring the ultimate health impacts; at lower prices, a ‘fat tax’ would only lower welfare.