Freedom to farm

As described in this New York Times article, Missourians are set to vote on a statewide constitutional amendment to "guarantee the right to 'engage in farming and ranching practices'.”

The amendment is supported by several farm groups in the state, and it comes about in response to initiatives in other states that have (or have tried to) outlaw certain animal production practices such as gestation crates for sows and battery cages for hens or to restrict use of genetically engineered crops.  

I'm not sure what to think about these sorts of amendments (a similar law was passed in North Dakota, and if this one in Missouri passes, I suspect we'll see similar propositions in other states).

On the one had, I see the supporters of the law trying to prevent the "unfunded mandates" that have occurred in other states: voters passing laws that shoppers are not fully willing to pay for via premiums in the marketplace.  On the other hand, the text of the law is vague and it is difficult to foretell what will be the consequences, intended and unintended alike.  

The amendment seems to enshrine a type of protectionism that is unlikely helpful for the economy.  Imagine an amendment to protect university professor's right to "engage in teaching and research practices" or an amendment 100 years ago to protect wagon wheel makers right to make wagon wheels.  It's hard to imagine those propositions gaining much support.  They - like the one aimed at farming - seem to violate of Kant's categorical imperative insofar as the rules attempt to set a different standard for farmers or professors or wagon wheel makers than for other workers or business owners.

This quote from a farmer in the NYT story reflects that sentiment:

““One thing’s for sure — it’s going to put ag culture above everybody else,” he said. “We’re going to be a different class of people. You won’t be able to complain about anything that we do. That should never be the case.””

That said, the attempt to paint this as a battle between "family farms" and "factory farms" is largely misplaced.  As if small family farmers don't like technology.  For example, here's one quote from Joe Maxwell, who works for who works for the Humane Society

““There are now two kinds of agriculture in America — we have seen over the last 30 years the advancement of the industrialized ag model,” Mr. Maxwell said. “The group of farmers who are aligned with industrialized ag believe big is better and they should be able to do whatever they want to the land and to the animals. Then there are a group of farmers who believe we are the caretakers of the land. I stand with many family farmers who are in opposition to this.””

There are many more kinds of agriculture than two.  Many family farmers are large; many use technology precisely because they want to take care of their land and animals.  

New Dietary Guidelines

The USDA and DHHS are in the process of revising the federal dietary guidelines.  It is unclear how similar or dissimilar the new recommendations will be relative to the current MyPlate recommendations. 

The committee drawing up the new recommendations has come under fire for what appears to be an attempt to work in environmental considerations when making the new dietary recommendations.

A recent appointment to the USDA has added further fuel to the fire.  Here's Jeff Stier writing in the Des Moines register:

“The appointment of Iowa’s Angela Tagtow, a controversial “environmental nutritionist” and local food activist, to head the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion is causing more headaches for the agency, already facing criticism about politicization of federal nutrition advice and its consequences for public health.”

It isn't necessarily a bad idea for the government to convey the scientific evidence on the environmental impacts of producing different foods.  The trouble comes when a single set of omnibus recommendations attempt to integrate disparate issues like environment, nutrition, and other factors.  

The trade-off between health outcomes, environmental outcomes, taste, and the price we pay (among other factors) is subjective and individual-specific.  Science might be able to tell us that eating food X is associated with environmental outcome Y and health outcome Z.  But, there is nothing in science that can tell us whether Y or Z is more important.  Nor should we expect every person to be willing to pay the same amount for Y or Z or to make the same trade-offs between taste and price to get these outcomes.  

Tell us which foods are more nutritious.  Tell us which foods are more environmentally friendly.  But, don't presume to know how much one values taste vs. nutrition, or environment vs. nutrition, or price vs. environment.  And, recognize that we can't have it all.  Life is full of trade-offs.  

A problem with cost-benefit analysis?

I'm a fan of cost-benefit analysis.  The approach provides a systematic way to think through the consequences of public policies and provides a reasonable approach to debate merits and demerits of a policy.  

Cost-benefit analysis shouldn't be the final word on a policy because there are some "rules" we may care about regardless of immediate short-run consequences.  For example, even if a cost-benefit analysis found that the benefits to TV thieves outweighed the costs to prior TV owners, few would support a policy of decriminalizing TV theft, in part because a society that had such little respect for property rights is not likely one that would be prosperous in the long-run (or enjoyable to live in for that matter).   All this is a way of saying that our moral intuitions often conflict (sometimes rightfully so) with a short-term utilitarian premise implied by cost benefit analysis (the trolley problem is a common example).

In the realm of food and public health policy, sometimes the way benefits and costs are calculated are myopic, fail to account for dynamic market responses to policies, and rest on shaky methodological assumptions.  Moreover, when we find that benefits exceed costs, one should also ask: what is preventing the market from capitalizing on this arbitrage opportunity?  Stated differently, there would need to be solid evidence of market failure (or some  government failure) in addition to a positive cost-benefit test to justify a public policy.          

Despite these qualms, I see cost-benefit analysis as a useful tool, and it provides one input into the decision making process.

Lately, I've been thinking about what happens to a cost-benefit analysis when one considers multiple policies - in an environment where are increasing calls for new regulations? 

Suppose one did a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on mandatory country of labeling for meat.  Then, a CBA on a ban on use of subtherapeurtic antibiotics in meat production.  Then, a CBA on a ban on growth hormones.  Then, a CBA on banning gestation crates in pork production.  Then, a CBA on banning transfats.  Then, a CBA on new water regulations for confined animal feeding operations.  Then, a CBA on a carbon tax on methane production from cows.  (I could go on - these represent but a few of the policies that are commonly batted around that have some impact on meat and livestock markets.)  

Is it possible that each of these policies - in isolation - could pass a cost benefit test, and yet when considered jointly fail the test?  Stated differently, is it possible to strictly follow a cost-benefit rule when adopting public policies (only passing policies that pass a CBA) and wind up with a world that we find as less desirable than the one we started with?

I think the answer may be "yes."  For example, each CBA in isolation will assume that the status quo prevails with regard to every other policy.  But, the general equilibrium effects could differ from these individual partial-equilibrium analyses, particularly if there are nonlinearities.

Tyler Cowen recently linked to a new paper by Ian Martin and Robert Pindyck on policies related to catastrophic events that also seems relevant to this discussion.

“How should we evaluate public policies or projects to avert or reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic event? Examples might include a greenhouse gas abatement policy to avert a climate change catastrophe, investments in vaccine technologies that would help respond to a “mega-virus,” or the construction of levees to avert major flooding. A policy to avert a particular catastrophe considered in isolation might be evaluated in a cost-benefit framework. But because society faces multiple potential catastrophes, simple cost-benefit analysis breaks down: Even if the benefit of averting each one exceeds the cost, we should not avert all of them.”

Cowen summarized the paper as follows: 

“The main point is simply that the shadow price of all these small anti-catastrophe investments goes up, the more of them we do, and thus we cannot do them all, even if every single investment appears to make sense on its own terms.”

Typical CBAs often ignore the the hundreds (if not thousands) of laws that already affect farmers' and food purveyors' ability to operate.  It does make one wonder whether diminishing returns shouldn't feature more prominently in CBA.

Effects of fat taxes and thin subsidies on the poor

I've been working on a paper with some French colleagues (Laurent Mueller and Bernard Ruffieux) using data from a food purchasing experiment in Grenoble and Lyon France looking at the effects of  "fat taxes" and "thin subsidies" on poorer vs. richer households.  The paper is still in review, so I won't yet go into the details of the results, but I can say that they closely align with the results of this new paper by Richard Tiffin and Matthew Salois that was just published in the European Review of Agricultural Economics.

They write that their:

“results reinforce the finding that a fiscal food policy based on a tax on saturated fats and a subsidy of fruits and vegetables is socially regressive”

and

“not only are the poorest households more negatively effected by the policy, but that even a subsidy is regressive because of the distribution of consumption of fruits and vegetables”

As they discuss, and we are finding in our work, such effects can occur through a number of channels.  Take a subsidy on fruits and veggies.  If richer households are already eating more fruits and veggies, who do you think receives the largest gains from the subsidy?  Fat taxes are regressive because the poor spend a larger share of their income on food (so taxes take a proportionally bigger chunk of their income) than the rich, but also because they are often eating more of the foods that will be taxed and because they may be less responsive to such price changes.  

The social and distributional consequences of these sorts of price policies are seldom discussed with any seriousness by those who promote the policies.   

Medicare and Medicaid as justification for public health interventions

When public health care costs rise due to obesity, diabetes, smoking, and the like, it is often said that an externality exists,justifying public intervention.  The logic is that as costs to Medicare and Medicaid rise, so too must taxes to offset the higher costs.  Thus, my health care costs (if I'm enrolled in Medicare or Medicaid) impose an externality on you the taxpayer.

I've written several times in the past suggesting that this sort of argument is not particularly well founded (e.g., see here or here or here). I ran across another line of reasoning in a post about immigration and the welfare state by Don Boudreaux that suggests how slippery a slope this sort of reasoning can be.

“And, while we’re at it, doesn’t the existence of the welfare state require government also to restrict which majors college students choose? Without a welfare state, students would be more focused on finding gainful employment after they graduate. But with a welfare state, the risk of being unemployed for long periods – or of earning very low pay for most of one’s working life – as a result of majoring in the likes of “race studies” or “dance criticism” will too often be ignored by irresponsible or lazy students, who rely upon welfare-state payments to subsidize their indulgence in majors that promise no decent monetary rewards.

Where does the enhanced scope for government action end once we admit that government buys for itself, by illegitimately exercising power W, an indulgence for the exercise of otherwise illegitimate power R? What sort of distrust of the motives and knowledge of government officials leads many self-described libertarians to oppose government’s exercise of power W but approve of government’s exercise of otherwise-illegitimate power R if government insists on simultaneously exercising illegitimate power W?”

The logic used to assert that existence of public health care benefits justifies restricting (or altering) consumers' choice of foods is no different than the logic Boudreaux uses (in jest) to argue that the existence of welfare programs and public unemployment benefits justifies restricting (or altering) student's choice of college majors.