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Food Labels - Environmental Edition

I had a recent request on Twitter asking for my thoughts on environmental labels for food.  The question seems to be motivated by recent discussions about the USDA and the Dept of Health and Human Services possibly incorporating environmental considerations into the federal dietary guidelines.  As I've previously noted, this move makes me a bit nervous because it entails non-scientific value judgments about how to integrate disparate issues (health and environment) into a single overall recommendation.  But, even as I said there: 

“It isn’t necessarily a bad idea for the government to convey the scientific evidence on the environmental impacts of producing different foods.”

Of course, that still leaves many unanswered questions.  What do we mean by environment?  Just C02, or is it water quality, or deforestation, or what?  Is the label voluntary or mandatory?  How will food companies respond to the label?  What do consumers understand about the label?  And so on.

In principle, it is possible to imagine something like a nutrition facts panel for environmental issues.  However, the two are not as analogous as might first appear.  First, scientists have a pretty good idea how to measure the fat, carb, and protein contents of food, whereas measuring C02 or deforestation impacts is tricky business with a lot of uncertainty.  Moreover, the nutritional content of a processed food is relatively stable regardless of where the raw ingredients came from, which plant or facility was used to manufacture it, how it got to the store, or how you transported and cooked it.  None of this would be true for an environmental label, which would require more more extensive (and more costly) monitoring and tracing, and if it is at all accurate, one could have two Wheaties boxes that are nutritionally equivalent but with very different environmental impacts.  That may be all the more reason to inform consumers, but the point I'm trying to emphasize here is the much higher cost and greater uncertainty in informing about nutrition vs the environment.  

Finally, an perhaps most importantly, nutritional outcomes are, by and large, what we economists would call "private goods."  The nutrient contents of the foods I eat affect me personally and not others (let's put aside Medicare/Medicare, which is another issue I've touched on here, here, here, and here).  In these cases, the effects of a label on my choices, and ultimate welfare consequences are more straightforward.  Let's compare that to environmental labels, which signal attributes associated with public goods and possible externalities, where we suspect there are likely to be problems with coordination, free riding, etc.  I suspect most economists would tend to look toward getting the property rights or the prices right as the "solutions" in these cases rather than looking toward labels (here's a paper I wrote on that issue).

Finally, I'll note there is a long literature in agricultural economics on food labels - focusing on when and under what conditions labels enhance social welfare.  The results of this literature are hard to summarize (meaning the effects are complex).  Here are a few good places to start if you're interested in the topic.

My answer to the question: should food products contain environmental labels?  I don't know.  There are far too many unanswered questions to say anything more precise than that.

Do farm subsidies prop up rural communities?

A new paper in the journal Applied Economic Perspectives & Policy by Jeremy Weber, Conor Wall, Jason Brown, and Tom Hertz asks whether farm subsidies boost the rural economy.  The abstract:

“Policy makers in the United States often justify agricultural subsidies by stressing that agriculture is the engine of the rural economy. We use the increase in crop prices in the late 2000s to estimate the marginal effect of increased agricultural revenues on local economies in the U.S. Heartland. We find that $1 more in crop revenue generated 64¢ in personal income, with most going to farm proprietors and workers (59%) or nonfarmers who own farm assets (36%). The evidence suggests a weak link between revenues and nonfarm income or employment, or on population. Cuts to agricultural subsidies are therefore likely to have little effect on the broader rural economy in regions like the Heartland.”

Who are the Soda Tax Baptists and Bootleggers?

That is a question asked by Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle in an article over at Reason.com.  They write of the traditional Baptist and Bootlegger scenario where one group with the moral high ground gives cover to another group with entirely different motives:

“Why “bootleggers and Baptists”? Recall that both historically supported laws that shut down liquor stores on Sunday, but for entirely different reasons. Taking the moral high ground, the Baptists fervently hoped to see a decline in alcohol consumption. Just as fervently, the bootleggers longed to eliminate competition at least for one day a week. Together, they formed a powerful duo.”

They then go on to discuss the various calls for soda taxes.  But, they apparently only see Baptists and no bootleggers.

“The “Baptist” part of the story is clear cut. Long-time support for such excise taxes comes from the American Heart Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the NAACP. These and other organizations see sweet drinks as a major detriment to American health and well-being that feeds our skyrocketing obesity and diabetes rates.

...

But where are the bootleggers? If we probe a wee bit deeper, we may discover why there is no bootlegger/Baptist success story for taxing away sugary drink consumption. Bootleggers are generally associated with producing substitutes for the highly-taxed or regulated item. For example, U.S. producers of natural gas love it when the Environmental Protection Agency places heavy restrictions on coal-burning power plants.”

Because Coca-Cola and other soda manufacturers also sell diet drinks, juices, water, and other non-taxed alternatives, they apparently don't have an incentive to be "bootleggers", and thus Smith and Yandle conclude there are none, which is why they argue that soda taxes haven't gotten far politically.

In part they're right.  But, I think they're missing an all together different sort of "bootlegger" in the story.  Some baptists are bootleggers: they're one and the same.   

Yes, non-profits, public health advocates, academics, and bureaucrats often make appeals that seem virtuous and Baptist-like.  But, often their motives are less than altruistic.  

Consider the fact that almost every call for soda or fat taxes also suggests that the tax receipts should be spent on activities that would directly or indirectly benefit said groups.  Here for example, is Mark Bittman in the New York Times

“The resulting income should be earmarked for a program that encourages a sound diet for Americans by making healthy food more affordable and widely available.”

A New York Assemblyman, arguing for a statewide fat tax said the proposal should go foward

“as long as the revenue is directly targeted and used to address a healthy lifestyle, and not to fill a budget gap”

Yes, these programs might benefit people's health.  But, look at who else the earmarks also help.  Who will be paid to do the education, promotion, monitoring, etc.?  Moreover, the federal government already spends millions of dollars every year on dietary and obesity research, and surely many academics would benefit from increased budgets for research and education grants on obesity, nutrition, and health care.

I'm not necessarily saying this sort of research or education shouldn't be done, but what I am saying is that many of the Baptists in this case also have (perhaps not even self conscious) bootlegger-type motives.  As a result, its often hard to have thoughtful discussions about the economic justifications (or lack thereof) of fat taxes.  I think it was Upton Sinclair who said

“It’s difficult to get a man to understand something if his salary depends upon his not understanding it.”

Lost Pleasure

I'm confused by this article by Sharon Begley that appeared in Reuters yesterday.  She writes:

“U.S. health regulators estimate that consumers will suffer up to $5.27 billion in “lost pleasure” over 20 years when calorie counts on restaurant menus discourage people from ordering french fries, brownies and other high-calorie favorites.

The lost-pleasure analysis, which is criticized by some leading economists and public health groups, was tucked into new regulations published last month by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration which require chain restaurants, grocery store chains selling prepared food, large vending machine operators, movie theaters and amusement parks to display calorie counts.

Public health advocates alerted Reuters to the inclusion of the analysis, which they say makes such regulations more vulnerable to challenges by industry because it narrows the gap between the government’s projections of a regulation’s benefits and costs. ”

Here's the problem - I can't find any evidence the FDA did such a thing in relation to calorie counts on menu labels.  Here is the FDA's final rule, which puts total costs at about $1.7 billion, which is far less than the $5.27 billion from "lost pleasure" cited in the article.  Indeed, the net benefits cited in the final rule are only $510 million - far less than the supposed "lost pleasure". Maybe there is another cost-benefit analysis not mentioned in the federal register?

Also, the article makes reference to a paper by Jason Abaluck, but the only paper of his I can find that seems to have any relation to this topic is this one, and it includes no such "lost pleasure" calculations that I see in my quick look at it.  Again, the paper may very well be out there and I've overlooked it. 

What I can find, after a bit of internet searching, is much concern about including "lost pleasure" in relation to tobacco labeling policies from back this summer, including the concern mentioned by some economists about using "lost pleasure" in this context.  

It's clear why many public health advocates don't like the idea of "lost pleasure" in a cost benefit analysis.  However, a good cost benefit analysis needs to include ALL the costs and ALL the benefits; and it must also consider the longer-term second order effects.  Moreover, many of the articles seems to suggest that "good economists" would never include "lost pleasure" in a cost benefit analysis - an implication that is wholly false.   

A lot of the discussion in these articles, including the one in Reuters, seems to suggest that "consumer surplus" is an invalid way to measure the benefits/costs of a policy.  That's baloney.  And, indeed I think you'd have a hard time finding many economists who wouldn't say that any policy analysis of food (or tobacco) taxes or bans SHOULD use "consumer surplus" which captures "lost pleasure" from being unable to consumer the same consumption bundle as was the case pre-policy.    

At issue seems to be the question of whether the same holds true for a mandatory labeling policy.  The argument is that information does not change prices or available options per se, and as such more information can only make consumers better off (more consumer surplus).  On the surface that's true - and I suspect that is the point the cited economists are making in objecting to using "lost pleasure" in this particular context.  However, it is not unreasonable to include "lost pleasure" in a cost benefit analysis of a label or information policy if:

  • food/tobacco companies respond to the new law by removing some options;
  • food/tobacco companies respond to the new law by changing prices; or
  • consumers continue making the same purchases after the policy, but only do so now with more "guilt" (there can only be a value of information if people change behavior; if you just reduce the pleasure they get from buying a product without changing behavior, then there is indeed "lost pleasure").