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Ruminations on Solutions to the COVID-Related Food Disruptions

Throughout this pandemic, there have been many prognostications about the future of eating and proposals to make sure we are better prepared for the future. A common solution that I hear being offered is more direct to consumer, more local, more distributed food supply systems. These ideas have an intuitive appeal and most take it as self evident that these food systems would be more robust and more resilient relative to the status quo. However, I haven’t seen much serious discussion about how these alternative types of food supply chains and systems would have actually performed if faced with the same massive and unexpected shocks witnessed over the past couple months. Buckle in. This is a longish post.

There were two distinct waves and causes to the disruptions in our food sector during the COVID pandemic. The first occurred in mid- to late-March when there was a near shut down in restaurant and food away from home sales and a corresponding spike in demand at grocery stores.

Many of the news stories at the time concerned empty shelves at the grocery store coupled with commodities being dumped or plowed under at the farm. The excess at the farm was primarily a result of the fact that demand for food away from home fell markedly, and the way we deliver food to restaurants is packaged and with machinery that is not easily amenable to delivering food to grocery stores. Moreover, in some cases, there were regulatory barriers that prevented food from moving from the food-away-from home stream to the grocery stream.

A key point here is that the “shock” to the food system was a massive demand shock, with demand destroyed at restaurants along side a big temporary boost in grocery-demand Within a matter of weeks (by early April), the grocery and manufacturing sector had largely work through the massive demand increase and shelves return to near full as groceries sales fell from the near 100% spike to running about 20 to 30% above normal.

What is it about direct to consumer food delivery or farmers markets that would have performed better to these demand shocks? Most of the vegetables that we saw being plowed under were destined for restaurants. Demand at restaurants was destroyed by shutdown orders. This demand destruction would have occurred regardless of whether the supplier to the restaurant was a small and local or whether they were large and distant. The issue wasn’t geographic proximity or scale, rather there was a lack of demand from particular buyers such as restaurants and cafeterias. We seem to notice the farm losses more when it happens on one large farm as opposed to it happening on many small farms.

As indicated, despite the dramatic demand spike, grocery stores were able to quickly work through the disruptions and return to normal within a matter of weeks. Are we really to believe that a supply chain executive for a large supermarket chain would have had an easier and more effective time coordinating with hundreds or thousands of small producers as opposed to a handful of large suppliers?  Would smaller manufacturers have been able to ramp up production as quickly in response to the grocery demand spike? Would public health have been better served by many small trucks entering cities to sell produce rather than a smaller number of large semis?

One thing about agricultural production is that it is seasonal. No farmer, whether small or large, local or distant, can immediately, within the time frame of one or two weeks, produce a new crop. The foods we see on our shelves today are a result of agricultural decisions made many months ago and no system, more or less distributed, is going to change that basic biological fact. Crops were destroyed because the demand we anticipated when planting didn’t materialize. Likewise, we don’t have a food replicator for those commodities we tend to buy in grocery stores, it takes time to grow and manufacture them. Thus, the initial challenge with food supply chain was a mismatch of supply and demand brought about by the fact that we cannot immediately respond to demand shocks because there are biological lags associated with agricultural production.

Isn’t the increase in visits to food banks a condemnation of the current food system? In my assessment, this outcome is a result of general economic conditions such as lost income and unemployment NOT a problem with the food system per se. Yes, it would have been nice to get some of the farm surplus to food banks, but someone still needs to pay to harvest, transport, and process it. It isn’t reasonable to expect farmers (local or distant) to incur these costs while they’re also losing significant income. Maybe it’s a role for government to step in and help fill the void, but again, this issue has little to do with the structure of our food supply chain and much more to do with the the overall economic harm people are suffering from lost income.

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The second major disruption occurred not from a demand shock but rather from a supply shock. In early April, meatpacking plants began closing when workers in the plants contracted COVID19. The meat industry structure is such that there are a small number of very large plants responsible for most of the packing. As such, when any one plant goes down, it’s large enough to have noticeable aggregate impacts in the market.

These observations have lead some folks, including myself, to ask whether a system with a larger number of more medium size plants might not be a more resilient system. One of the reasons COVID19 seems to have heavily affected meat packing is the labor intensive nature of meat packing plants, and the fact that packing plant workers are in a cold, refrigerated environments where air is re-circulated. I appears this environment is particularly conducive to virus spread from worker to worker.

Do we have any evidence that smaller or more medium-size plant wouldn’t have the same sorts of issues with spread of virus from worker-to-worker? All plants, regardless of size, want to control costs. A packing plant requires a large refrigerated building, the cost of which needs to be spread over as many pounds of production as possible. Moreover, when USDA inspectors are required, when there are labs and tests to run, and workers to pay, there is a strong incentive to ensure that a plant can accomplish as much production as possible in as little time as possible. It strikes me that even a more medium sized plant will face the economic incentives to have workers in close proximity (extra square footage in refrigerated atmospheres is very expensive). It’s one reason that I think a more adept solution is automation to reduce reliance on labor.

When we talk about resiliency, somehow people first think of size. But I’m not so sure size is the key in this context; rather, a key characteristic is redundancy. The problem in the current situation is that we have too many animals and not enough room to process them. So, the “fix” is extra capacity in the system.

But, somebody has to pay for that capacity. What we’re essentially asking is for someone to build a multi- million dollar facility and keep it idle for large parts of the week or the year in anticipation of some unexpected future fire, tornado, or pandemic. No company in a competitive environment can withstand the high cost of such idle productive capacity. Even if we could, by government mandate or construction, create new processing plants to create redundant plants in the unlikely event of a fire, tornado, or pandemic, we’d still have to have the ability, in a moment’s instance to ramp up the plant, scale production, hire workers, etc. to pick up the excess from other plants.

There’s also a very strong assumption that there are many communities who want a new packing plant in their backyard. Are there really 100 such communities in the country? Remember the controversy this past fall when Costco wanted to open a new poultry processing plant in rural Nebraska?

Meat packing capacity took a big hit for a couple weeks, but we already appear to be on the rebound (today’s data suggests we are running at about 25% below last year as compared to the 40% reduction we were seeing a week or so ago). Whatever ills result from a small number of very large plants processing most of the livestock in the country, one upside is that we know where the problems are and we have concentrated local, state, local federal efforts (from health authorities to OSHA to USDA) to bring those plants back online as quickly as possible. Would such coordination be as efficient and effective had there instead been hundreds or thousands of small packing plants that were closed down? Again, it strikes me that one of the reasons we’ve focused so much attention on size and scale in meat packing is that it’s so much easier to see when it’s concentrated, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that a more disaggregated system wouldn’t have larger aggregate impacts. That is, we may be suffering from availability bias.

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None of the above discussion is meant to besmirch local foods or more direct-to-consumer markets. All systems involve costs and trade-offs, including our present supply chain. We can and should try to do better. Let’s also make sure we think hard and ensure efforts to improve will actually achieve the outcomes we want.

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P.S. I’ve used the word “food system” in this post for ease of exposition but I strongly agree with Rachel Laudan that, “there is not ‘a’ food system but multiple cris-crossing supply chains, some connected, some not.”

Meat Packing Closures - an update

The number one question I’ve been asked in recent days is: how long will it take to resume meat processing capacity? The honest answer is: I don’t know. However, all the efforts to get plants back online appear to be having some effect.

The decline in cattle and hog processing volumes appears to have leveled off an even improved a bit in recent days. We’ve gone from 40% below 2019 to now “only” about 30% below 2019. Some cause for optimism?

slaughter numbers relative to last year.JPG

By the way, this situation is making us all aware of the heavy labor reliance in meat processing. It is possible to have more automation in animal processing. See this video of an automated lamb processing facility in New Zealand. I’m not sure how applicable it is to beef since cattle are much more variable in size and shape.

America’s Indispensable Industry

That’s the title of an editorial Glynn Tonsor and I wrote for the City Journal.

Here’s an excerpt:

In the future, owners of large food-processing and packing facilities may look to more regionally distributed facilities to mitigate supply risks that occur from a total plant shutdown. It may be prudent to sacrifice some economies of scale in order to provide insurance against plant shutdowns caused by human-spread illnesses. Such analyses will surely start soon, warranting a balance of security during pandemics with economic efficiency during normal times.

Besides economies of scale, the concentration of meat processing is a function of high regulatory and oversight costs, which may deter the emergence of a larger number of smaller processors. Requiring federal inspectors and testing regimes is prudent from a food-safety standpoint, but as we’re now seeing, such measures may create other risks when the barriers to entry are too high. In fact, adjustments in some of these regulations may well help the industry navigate current Covid-19 challenges.

Another solution is to reduce labor use through increased automation. The nuts-and-bolts assembly of automobiles or even computer chips doesn’t carry over well to animals that come in widely varying shapes, sizes, weights, and even colors. Advancements in robotics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence, however, are beginning to allow more automation in the processing of animal carcasses. We need to invest in research in digital agriculture and automation to help eliminate tedious—and sometimes dangerous—jobs, while reducing the likelihood of disrupted food supplies resulting from illnesses in processing plants. This approach, combined with the likely continuation of workforce health monitoring, may permanently alter labor relations in the meat-processing industry.

Beef Marketing Margins

We are currently running at 35% to 40% below last year’s beef processing capacity due to COVID19-related shutdowns and slowdowns. As, I’ve previously noted, wholesale beef prices are rising as a result. At the same time, cattle prices have been taking a hit.

Here are USDA data from the Livestock Marketing Information Center showing the change in fed cattle price (the 5-market average steer price, over 80% choice) and wholesale choice boxed beef price since the beginning of the year. Since January, wholesale beef prices are up 67% but live cattle prices are down 24%.

Changesinbeefcattleprices.JPG

What’s going on? I’ve talked to enough journalists in the past month to know that these divergent price movements seems almost paradoxical. It is not a paradox. It’s basic economics at work. You can find all the supply and demand graphs here, but the basic explanation is as follows.

When a packing plant goes down, the packers don’t need as many cattle. That is, a plant closure results in too many cattle floating around relative to the ability to process them. There is an excess supply of cattle given to the processing capacity. Thus, plant closures cause a reduction in demand for fed cattle. As a result, cattle prices fall.

At the same time, a plant closure means fewer cattle getting turned into burgers and steaks. A plant closure results in less meat being on the market. There is a reduction in meat supply. Groceries and consumers are left competing for a smaller amount of meat, which results in meat prices getting bid up.

The divergence in cattle and meat prices, causes the so-called “marketing margin” to increase. Here is a graph of the marking margin (the difference in wholesale beef and cattle prices) over time since January 1, 2019. The last time we saw an increase in the marketing margin of this magnitude was back in August of 2019, which was when there was a plant closure for an altogether different reason (an accidental fire in a packing plant in Holcomb).

beef_marketingmargin.JPG

The rising margin (both in August and now) has led to calls from legislators to investigate packing firms’ behavior.

There is no doubt that falling cattle prices have harmed the economic well-being of farmers and ranchers. It is less clear that the packers profit every time the marketing margin increases. As described in this paper by Gary Brester, John Marsh, and Joe Atwood:

marketing margins are not reliable measures of changes in producer surplus (welfare) given exogenous shocks to various economic factors. ... In fact, little or no accurate information is conveyed by [farmer’s share of the retail dollar] statistics.

While we can observe the price of cattle and the price of wholesale beef, and thus the marketing margin, what we can’t observe are the packer’s costs. A plant fire is a huge cost. Likewise, running a plant at lower capacity with workers spaced out for social distancing is costly; it is also costly to close down, refrigerate empty buildings, pay sick employees who aren’t at work, install partitions between workers, deal with legal challenges, etc. Presumably, if it was in a packer’s interest to significantly reduce capacity, they could have closed down any of their plants prior to the emergence of COVID19. The fact that they didn’t voluntarily shut down processing facilities suggests they believe they’re better off trying to run near capacity. The packer’s business model relies on trying to running plants at or near capacity to obtain cost efficiencies to make a small amount by selling large volumes.

All that said, it is of course, possible the packers are more profitable with rising marketing margins. Even though we can’t observe packers’ costs, we can observe the market’s perception of their profitability - at least for publicly traded firms. The price of a stock reflects the market’s expectations of a firm’s profitability, and one widely accepted model of stock price determination is that stock prices reflect the net-present value of all future dividends (i.e., profits) paid to shareholders.

Here is the change in the price of Tyson (TSN - solid black line), JBS (JBSAY - pinkish line), and the S&P 500 for reference (the purple line). The two meat packing firms have taken a big hit since COVID-19 disruptions began. In fact, they’ve taken a bigger hit than other types of companies listed in the S&P 500. While there was a brief increase in stock price last week, both Tyson and JBS’s stock have fallen today; both are down nearly 40% relative to the first of the year.

tysonstock.JPG

So, what can we say about winners and losers from COVID-19 in the meat and livestock sectors? We know consumers are worse off. Consumers are paying higher prices for less meat. We know livestock producers are worse off. They’re receiving lower prices and selling fewer animals. And packers? The graph above suggests they’re worse off too. It’s a kick in the pants all the way around. Whose to blame? The coronavirus.

Changes in Meat Supply and Demand

Back in January, I posted about a paper I wrote with Glynn Tonsor about an approach to disentangle price and quantity changes to determine if they were occurring from a shift in the supply curve, a shift in the demand curve, or both. If there was ever a time to put these calculations to good use, this is it.

Because of the COVID-related shutdown and slowdown in meat processing, we know the supply curve for meat has shifted upward and to the left (i.e., the marginal cost of producing a pound of beef or pork has risen). Since the beginning of March, it’s less clear what has happened to demand. First, there was the closure of many restaurants (which would depress demand) but there was also the run on grocery stores and the stocking-up that occurred in mid to late March (which would boost demand). How is all this netting out?

Using the same data on wholesale meat prices and slaughter numbers that I’ve been posting about in the last couple weeks, I created supply and demand indicies for wholesale beef and pork using the formulas described in this paper.

The figure below shows the changes in wholesale beef supply and demand relative to the beginning of March. Beginning in mid-March beef demand began to rise and outpace supply as consumers stocked up amidst the shut-down panic. Apparently, in the short run, the stocking up behavior offset the loss of food away from home sales, and aggregate beef demand increased. This behavior, however tailed off and demand began to fall until about April 9th, after which it started to increase again. At about the same time, beef supply began to fall. The simultaneous combination of rising beef demand and falling beef supply is why we are seeing such dramatic wholesale beef price increases.

beefSDindex.JPG


What about pork? Overall, the general pattern is similar to that of beef, except that after the mid- to late-March peaking stocking up phase, pork demand has continued to trend downward. Pork supply has also trended downward since about April 9th with the plant closures and shutdowns. The fact that pork demand, in aggregate, is now below where we were at at the beginning of March means there has been less upward pressure on wholesale pork prices. At least in the case of pork, the loss of food away from home sales has depressed demand by more than stocking up behavior has in grocery outlets has boosted demand.

porkSDindex.JPG