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Testimony before the US House of Representatives

Earlier today I testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee. The topic was "State of the Beef Supply Chain: Shocks, Recovery, and Rebuilding." Links to hearing and written testimonies of the four witnesses can be found here.

My written testimony is reproduced below (or, if it’s easier to read, in this pdf).

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Chairman Costa, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. I am a food and agricultural economist and I serve as Distinguished Professor and Head of the Agricultural Economics Department at Purdue University.

I will begin by providing some background on some of the economic factors that have contributed to the volatility in cattle and beef markets in recent years. Then, I will shift my focus to three economic issues currently facing the beef cattle industry: packing capacity and resiliency, price discovery, and the importance of trade and innovation.

For the past couple years, beef and cattle markets have been extraordinarily turbulent and volatile. Major events include the loss of a major packing plant to fire in 2019, demand-induced disruptions from COVID-19 resulting from the decline in restaurant spending and the spike in grocery spending, supply-induced disruption from COVID-19 resulting from the worker illnesses in packing plants, increasing feed prices, drought in the West, and recently, increased Chinese imports and cyber-attacks. Only one other year in the past 30 has witnessed more volatility in live fed cattle prices than 2020. Consumers likewise experienced significant price shocks. Retail beef prices increased 25% year-over-year price in June 2020 before falling 3% year-over-year in May 2021.

When trying to understand the current challenges, some historical perspective is warranted. Over the past decade, cattle inventories have followed a V-shaped pattern. Corresponding cattle prices have followed an inverse V-shaped pattern. From 2010 to 2015, total number of commercial cattle slaughtered fell by more than 16%. The decline resulted from producers cutting inventory as a result of a dramatic increase in feed prices and a drought in some parts of the Midwest. The change in cattle numbers affected the packing sector. There was, at the time, too much packing capacity relative to the number of cattle, and returns to cattle processing took a hit. Some small and medium packers exited because it was no longer profitable, and some large packers shuddered plants in an attempt to align capacity with inventory.

The high levels of capacity relative to cattle numbers, coupled with strong demand, led to a rise in cattle prices. Following a common cyclical pattern (the “cattle cycle”), producers retained heifers and expanded their herds to capture the benefits of higher prices that were experienced in 2014 and 2015. By 2019, total commercial cattle slaughter had increased 16.7% relative to the 2015 low. The packing sector, having adjusted to a smaller herd size, now found itself in the opposite position: there was a high number of cattle relative to processing capacity, which put downward pressure on cattle prices. It was against this backdrop that we experienced the unexpected fire, pandemic, and cyber-attack that further exacerbated the effects of limited capacity. If these unexpected events had occurred in 2014 or 2015, the impacts on producers would have been much different.

There is a key lesson to take from this recent historical episode. There are long lags and ripple effects in cattle and beef markets. A producer makes a decision today to breed a cow, and it will be roughly three years till the resulting offspring is ready for market. Likewise, investors today decide to build a new packing plant. It will be years before construction is finished and the capacity is brought online. Everyone is betting on the future with information that ultimately be two to three years old by the time outcomes are realized. Cattle inventories have already started to fall, and cattle prices have risen since last summer. My recommendation to you, as policy makers, is the following: do not overly focus on what is happening today. Consider what will be needed 3 to 5 years from now. Market participants adapt to changing circumstances, although sometimes more slowly than we’d like because of biological and construction lags, but policy ideally should focus on longer-run forces that improve the well-being of producers and consumers in an industry.

With that backdrop, I will move on to the first of three current issues facing the industry. There are a number of state and federal initiatives to increase processing capacity. As previously, noted, processing capacity in 2020, even if the pandemic hadn’t occurred, was likely to be “tight,” which contributed to downward pressure on cattle prices. We appear, however, to be in a different phase of the cattle cycle. Cattle inventory is falling. Feed prices are rising. There is a drought in West. These factors will, over time, likely bring cattle numbers closer in line with current capacity. Moreover, even absent federal investments, there are a number of private initiatives to increase automation and add more packing capacity. More capacity, and fewer cattle, will help support future cattle prices. But, as the experience of the past decade has revealed, that will not be the end of the story. Whether we are setting ourselves up, in five years' time, for another situation in the packing sector like the one experienced in 2014 and 2015 remains to be seen. Additional government investments in capacity, for the purpose of improving cattle prices, may be fixing yesterday’s problem.

There is another argument being made for adding capacity: improving resiliency to the sector. Extra capacity could be seen as a form of insurance against unexpected capacity reductions from events like fire, pandemic, or cyber-attack. COVID-19 infections led to and dramatic reduction the nation’s beef slaughter capacity. There was little excess capacity in the system and nowhere for market-ready cattle to go. My research with Purdue colleague Meilin Ma indicates that even if we would have had a more distributed packing sector consisting of more small and medium sized plants instead of a small number of large plants, the price spread dynamics and beef supply disruptions would not have likely have been appreciably different than what we witnessed. The problem at the time was not the size or localness of the plants but total industry capacity.

However, excess capacity is expensive, and it is in no individual packer’s interest to routinely operate at significantly reduced capacity. Imagine approaching an investor asking for tens of millions of dollars with a plan to only operate a facility at only 50% capacity. Few bankers would agree to such a deal. Support for subsidizing additional processing capacity might be justified on public insurance grounds, but ultimately, the ebbs and flows of the cattle cycle will determine the long-run size of the packing industry, and newly subsidized plants will be at an advantage over older existing plants when cattle numbers come back in line with capacity and ultimate profitability determines the size of the packing sector. Support for small and local processors might benefit local economic ecosystems and increase custom harvest operations for producers, but these operations, because they lack economies of scale, must focus on quality and service to be competitive, and are such a small part of the national industry that investments at this size are unlikely to significantly alter the aggregate industry capacity. It is also worth noting that costs of adding packing capacity are not limited to concrete and iron. I encourage you to consider other costs and barriers that limit new entrants thus expanded capacity. Availability of labor has been a significant challenge for the industry and labor constraints put a limit on processing capacity. Other factors include the costs of complying with federal, state, and local regulations related to labor, food safety, zoning, transportation, and more.

Second, in light of the relatively low cattle prices experienced in 2020, there have been a number of proposals to affect the marketing of cattle. One set of concerns has focused on the share of cattle sold on a negotiated or cash basis. While the share of cattle sold in this manner, roughly 20%, has not changed much since the high-cattle-price era experienced in 2014 and 2015, it is lower than was the case a decade ago. Cattle sold on a formula basis often utilize the negotiated, cash price as a base. Thus, trades on a relatively small number of cattle influence the price for a much larger number of formula-priced cattle. A concern has emerged as to whether there are enough trades in the cash market to truly reflect market fundamentals. In efforts to improve price discovery, an important distinction needs to be made: price levels and price volatility. Even if all cattle were traded on a negotiated, cash basis, the price level would not necessarily improve; however, we might be more confident that any given transaction would be reflective of the “true” underlying supply and demand conditions at the time and location. Whether, in fact, there are too few cash transactions to reflect market fundamentals is debatable.

Attempting to mandate more cattle be sold in a negotiated, cash basis has potential benefits and certain costs. The fact that most producers and packers choose to sell cattle using alternative marketing arrangements suggests they see benefits in this form of marketing in the form of increased certainty, lower transactions costs, and supply chain coordination. Mandating a certain percent of cattle be sold on a negotiated basis would entail some producers and packers foregoing a marketing method they currently find more desirable. That is a cost. Moreover, strengthening of consumer demand for beef over the past couple decades has occurred over a period in which there was increased use of formula pricing that rewarded quality improvements. Eroding the ability of consumers, retailers, and packers to incentivize quality through formulas and vertical coordination may have detrimental impacts on demand.

The best economic case for mandating more negotiated transactions rests on the argument that price discovery is a public good. Are there less costly ways to improve price discovery than a mandate? Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is one tool that has improved price transparency and discovery. Continued research into improvements in this legislation might further facilitate price discovery. Taxes to avoid, or subsidies to use, negotiated cash markets are seldom mentioned despite having similar economic intuition as a mandate. Even if a mandate were pursued, it might be made more efficient if coupled with a “cap and trade” system, where obligations to secure cattle in a cash market might be bought and sold in a secondary “offset” market similar to what currently exists for fuel manufactures mandated to blend a given amount of biofuels. Including negotiated grid or formula transactions in a mandate would also lessen the costs of the policy. It is important to consider solutions that may be less costly and restrictive than a mandate because the cattle industry is constantly evolving and needs to remain cost-competitive with other animal- and plant-proteins to have a place on consumers’ dinner plates.

I will conclude with an encouragement to focus on policies that improve the health of the entire industry. Discussions of cattle prices and packing capacity can give the impression that beef and cattle markets represent a zero-sum game. But, one party’s gain does not have to come at the expense of another. What policies increase the size of the pie available to all participants: cow-calf producers, backgrounders, feedlots, packers, retailers, and ultimately, consumers?

As witnessed in recent months, improved trade relations have the ability improve economic circumstances for multiple segments of the industry. The U.S. exports about 12% of beef production. Trade agreements are important to help open markets for U.S. producers to allow products to flow to consumers who value them most.

Investments in research and innovation that increase demand or improve productivity are likely a net win for consumers, producers, and the environment. Had we not innovated since 1970, about 11 million more feedlot cattle would have been needed to produce the amount of beef U.S. consumers actually enjoyed last year. Innovation and technology saved the extra land, water, and feed that these cattle would have required, as well as the waste and greenhouse gases that they would have emitted. Investments in research to improve the productivity of livestock and poultry can improve producer profitability, consumer affordability, and the sustainability for food supply chain.

Despite the challenges of the past couple years, the beef cattle system responded remarkably well to a series of large, unexpected disruptions. Producer prices have been on the rise. Consumer demand is strong. These core facts should remain front of mind when considering changes that would significantly affect the cattle industry going forward.

Price Discovery in Cattle Markets

With the change in administration and controversies still swirling around the COVID-related market disruptions, there are many active conversations and policy proposals focused on concentration and pricing in cattle markets. Many of my colleagues have had smart things to say on these topics. To mention just a few, check out the recent hearing of the U.S. Senate Ag Committee featuring testimony by Glynn Tonsor, Mary Hendrickson, Dustin Aherin, Mark Gardiner, and Justin Tupper, or see this piece by economists Derrell Peel, David Anderson, John Anderson, Chris Bastian, Scott Brown, Steve Koontz, and Josh Maples, or some previous writing by Koontz.

One of the main issues being debated is that, over time, fewer fed cattle are being sold in the cash or spot market. Rather, cattle are increasingly sold via various formulas or contracts. The rub is that most of the contracts use the cash market price as base to which premiums and discounts are add or subtracted. That is, a relatively small percentage of trades are determining the price for a relatively large number of cattle. Are there “enough” transactions in the spot, cash market to truly reflect market fundamentals and facilitate price discovery (and some have argued, to prevent “market manipulation” by any one party)? This is actually an old problem facing agriculture as concentration and consolidation has occured. For example, Bill Tomek has a seminal paper from 1980 on thin markets entitled “Price Behavior on a Declining Terminal Market.”

Some of the current policy proposals involve a mandate or requirement that packers buy a certain percentage of their cattle in the spot market. This approach would, presumably, improve price discovery. However, it comes at a cost. Many of the current contracts reward beef quality. Might quality, and thus consumer demand, fall if such incentives were eroded? More fundamentally, it can be noted that the increasing trend away from cash markets reflects voluntary choices on the part of producers and packers, who both presumably see some benefit in pursing alternative marketing arrangements relative to the cash market. Mandating a certain percent of trades occur on the cash market would require some producers to sell in the cash market who presumably would have preferred to sell by contract or formula. That’s a cost.

That said, there could also be benefits from more cash trades. Those benefits might be thought of as a type of public good because, as pointed out in some of the aforementioned testimony and writings, improved price discovery doesn’t necessarily mean higher prices for producers. Rather, it means that any given trade is likely to be more reflective of market fundamentals vs. “noise” or other idiosyncrasies (see the Tomek article for a deeper treatment of the issue).

So, there are benefits and costs to mandating more cattle be sold in the cash market. You can click on the aforementioned links to see for yourself where most of the economists wind up on this issue. My point here isn’t to weigh in on that topic per se. One role of academics, advocated most effectively in Roger Pielke Jr’s book The Honest Broker is to try to expand the opportunity set of ideas.

If the goal is to increase price discovery, are there more efficient ways to do that than mandate a certain percentage of cattle be sold on the spot market? Or, are there ways to make a mandatory cap less costly on the system?

A few thoughts (other, related ideas, have been offered by many of the folks I linked to previously).

A mandate might be made more efficient if accompanied with a "cap and trade" system. If each packing plant must buy a certain percent of cattle on the cash market, a secondary market could be created for this federally assigned "obligation to buy cattle." Each packer would have a mandated obligation to buy a certain number of cattle in a certain amount of time. They can either fulfill that obligation by buying cattle OR by buying “offsets” from another packer or entity. These offsets essentially transfer the obligation to buy cattle in the spot market from another packer to another packer (or another entity).

Prices in this secondary “offset” market would reflect the cost of requiring additional cash transactions. More importantly, this approach would ensure that those cattle being bought and sold on the cash market are those most efficiently sold in that manner. While perhaps a bit crazy, there are active secondary markets like this for fuel, where refineries are federally required to buy and blend a certain amount of biofuels (see this explanation of RINs), and there are similar schemes to mitigate pollution in the most cost-effective way (see this piece about SO2 cap-and-trade).

The futures market is another area where price discovery for cattle occurs, and even in the absence of many cash trades, the futures price is relevant particularly given that live cattle futures contracts can be settled with physical delivery of cattle. If futures markets are also "too thin," why not have the mandate act on the futures price rather the physical animals per se? That might reduce transactions cost.

If the issue of price discovery is really a public-good issue, there is a very large economics literature on these topics. From a purely technocratic standpoint, one way to discourage free-riding is to tax the behavior (in this case, it would mean a tax on transactions not in the cash market). Or, one might subsidize sales in the cash market (how are the subsidies funded?). How would the efficiencies of these tax and subsidy policies compare to a mandate?

Or, perhaps we academics can take a page out of Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom’s book, and sit back and see what norms and practices emerge to help solve this particular tragedy of the commons.

Two Blades of Grass: The Impact of the Green Revolution

That’s the title of a paper by Douglas Gollin, Casper Hansen, and Asger Wingender just published in the Journal of Political Economy (an earlier ungated version is here). It’s unusual to find a paper focused on a core agricultural and farming question published in one of the top general interest economics journals, but I suspect the magnitude of the effects are so large, it’s hard to ignore. Here’s the abstract:

We estimate the impact of the Green Revolution in the developing world by exploiting exogenous heterogeneity in the timing and extent of the benefits derived from high-yielding crop varieties (HYVs). We find that HYVs increased yields by 44% between 1965 and 2010, with further gains coming through reallocation of inputs. Higher yields increased income and reduced population growth. A 10-year delay of the Green Revolution would in 2010 have cost 17% of GDP (gross domestic product) per capita and added 223 million people to the developing-world population. The cumulative GDP loss over 45 years would have been US$83 trillion, corresponding to approximately one year of current global GDP.

Carbon Markets and Agriculture

There is a lot of interest in “carbon markets” in agricultural circles. It is a bit of a Wild West at the moment, and there are more unknowns than knowns. Against that backdrop, I thought I’d share this excellent webinar with three of my Purdue colleagues, Jim Mintert, Nathan Thompson, and Carson Reeling. The webinar initially offers a “Carbon Market 101” for folks new to concept before getting into nitty gritty and some of the opportunities and challenges facing those interested in getting paid to sequester carbon in row-crop agriculture. Thorough, timely, and informative!

Beef, Chicken, and Carbon Emissions

There seems to be rising attention paid to the environmental impacts of meat consumption. Some people see plant-based meat alternatives as one way to address this concern, and they question whether it is possible to see a big shift in the types of “meat” consumers buy. Such a shift, in fact, has occurred over the past fifty years - a period during which we’ve observed a remarkable change in meat consumption patterns.

The figure below shows US per-capita consumption (lbs/person/year) of beef and chicken from 1970 to 2020 based on USDA data. On a retail-weight basis, per capita consumption of beef fell from an annual average of 86 lbs/person in the 1970s to 56.7 lbs/person in 2010s (i.e., from 2010 to 2019) - a 34% reduction. At the same time, chicken consumption went from 38.9 lbs in the 1970s to 86.9 lbs in the 2010s - a 123% increase. Total consumption of these two meats has increased from an annual average of 124.8 lbs in the 1970s to 143.5 lbs in the 2010s.

meatconsumption.JPG

Using the per-capita consumption data (expressed instead on a carcass rather than retail basis), coupled with additional USDA data on yield (lbs produced per animal) over time, one can infer the number of animals each person in the U.S. eats each year on average.

In the 1970s, the average American ate 14.5 chickens/year, a figure that increased to 22.3 chickens by the 2010s. In the 1970s, the average American ate 0.19 cows/year, a figure that fell to only 0.1 cows/year in the 2010s. Stated differently, it took about 5.3 years for the average American to eat one whole cow in the 1970s; at today’s consumption levels, it takes nearly a decade before the average American eats a whole cow.

What is the impact of this consumption pattern change from beef to chicken on one key environmental measure: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ?

One UN Food and Agricultural Organization study indicates that there are 5.4 kg of CO2 equivalent gasses emitted for every kg of carcass weight of chicken meat produced. USDA data indicate the average carcass weight of U.S. broilers over the past decade is about 4.53 lbs/bird (or 2.06 kg/bird). This means, each bird is associated with 11.1 kg of C02. Because consumers are now eating 22.3-14.5 = 7.9 more chickens each year than they were in the 1970s, this means they are also emitting 7.9*11.1 = 87.3 kg more CO2 than in the 1970s (assuming the per-head chicken emissions haven’t changed over time).

Has the reduction in beef consumption been enough to offset the increases in carbon emissions from the increased consumption of chicken? According to one study, roughly 22 kg of CO2 are emitted for every kg of carcass weight of beef produced. Cattle carcass weights have averaged about 804.7 lbs/head (or 365.8 kg/head) for the past decade, meaning each cow generates 8,047 kg of CO2 equivalent gasses. Because U.S. consumers are now eating 0.19-0.1 = 0.09 fewer cows each year than in the 1970s, they are emitting 0.09*8047 = 705.6 fewer kg of CO2 equivalent gasses from beef consumption (again, assuming the per-head beef emissions haven’t changed over time). Some of this reduction is because people are consuming less beef (per-capita consumption feel from 116 lbs to 81 lbs on a carcass weight basis), but also because cattle yields have substantially increased from about 617 lbs/cow in the 1970s to 804.7 in the 2010s) - we are getting more beef from each head of cattle.

So, the average American is emitting 87.3 more kg CO2 from extra chicken consumption but has cut 705 kg CO2 from less beef consumption since the 1970s. Looks like a net carbon win. And one that isn’t even close.

One pushback to this point may be that there are more people today than in the 1970s, so per-capita numbers may be misleading. Throughout the 1970s, the US population averaged 215 million, whereas in the 2010s, population averaged 319.6 million. Taking this into consideration, in aggregate, calculations suggest Americans are today consuming about 4 billion more chickens and 8.3 million fewer cattle than in the 1970s. Using the aforementioned per-head emissions implies we are, in aggregate, emitting 44.7 million metric tons (MMT) more CO2 from extra chickens but 67.1 less MMT CO2 from fewer cattle. Thus, on net, we are emitting 22.4 MMT fewer CO2 equivalent gasses from our aggregate beef and chicken consumption today than in the 1970s. Thus, it still appears a net carbon “win” even adjusting for population change.

While we’re at it, the data used in the above calculations can be used to ask a number of counter factional questions.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if we hadn’t increased productivity (or yield) since the 1970s? Answer: 52.7 MMT more CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if population staid at 1970s levels? Answer: 25.9 MMT less CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if per-capita consumption staid at 1970’s levels? Answer: 48.4 MMT less CO2.

Now the same questions for beef.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if we hadn’t increased productivity (or yield) since the 1970s? Answer: 78.73 MMT more CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if population staid at 1970s levels? Answer: 84.67 MMT less CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if per-capita consumption staid at 1970’s levels? Answer: 112.57 MMT more CO2.

To give some sense of scale, the EPA GHG inventory data suggests all U.S. agriculture was responsible for 628 MMT CO2 equivalent emissions in 2019.

All in all, it seems meat consumption patterns have become much more carbon friendly since the 1970s - that’s not a headline one often sees.

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Note: One assumption in all the above calculations is that the CO2 emissions per head for both chicken and beef haven’t changed over time. While these factors have no doubt changed, it seems unlikely that they have changed enough over time to overturn the basic beef/chicken comparisons above, but I highlight it here to note that the magnitudes are uncertain. Moreover, I’ve converted measures to a per-head (rather than per pound produced) metric because it strikes me that GHG impacts primarily depend on the size of the animal inventory, and if we can get more meat from each animal in the same amount of time (say, from improved genetics), that wouldn’t necessarily imply greater GHG emissions. All my calculations are in this spreadsheet if someone wants to check me.

Finally, thanks to Jack Bobo who asked me some questions, which prompted the writing of this post.