Sunstein on GMO labeling

At Bloomberg.com, Cass Sunstein sensibly weighed in on the ongoing state and federal proposals to mandate labeling of GMO foods.  He argues that mandatory labels are a bad idea.  His reasoning is that ​the science shows biotechnology to be safe with few unique environmental concerns; however, requiring a label would "signal" that something is unsafe.  

Here is Sunstein:​

GM labels may well mislead and alarm consumers, especially (though not only) if the government requires them. Any such requirement would inevitably lead many consumers to suspect that public officials, including scientists, believe that something is wrong with GM foods -- and perhaps that they pose a health risk.

His arguments are virtually identical to those I published in a paper with Anne Rozan in the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics back in 2008 entitled "Public Policy and Endogenous Beliefs: The Case of Genetically Modified Food."  We wrote then:

Our argument is that policy can serve as a signal about the safety of GM food

and, conceptually:

Believing the government imposes a mandatory labeling policy on GM food could be consistent with a belief that GM food is perhaps not as safe as traditional food, but it is not so unsafe that GM food should be completely banned. Depending on a consumer's prior beliefs about the safety of GM food, the imposition of mandatory labeling could be taken to imply GM food is safer than previously thought (in the case where one's prior was that GM food is so unsafe it should be banned) or might be taken to imply GM food is riskier than previously thought (in the case where one's prior is that GM food is safe enough to warrant no labeling at all).

​Empirically, we found:

that individuals who believed the government imposed a mandatory labeling policy for GM food believed GM food was less safe and were less willing to eat and buy GM food than consumers who either believed no policy was in place or were uncertain on the matter

As we discussed in that paper, and as I've discussed elsewhere, such findings make cost benefit analysis really complicated.  How much would consumers "benefit" from a mandatory GMO label?  That depends on how much they are willing to pay for non-GMO food.  But, if our arguments are right, willingness-to-pay for non-GMO food depends on which policy is in place.  Thus, the benefits (and costs) of the policy are not independent of whether the policy is in place.  The act of passing (or failing to pass) the policy changes the benefits and benefits.  Thus, there are no "objective" or "true" benefits and costs.

Although I agree with Sunstein on this point, I find it a little ironic coming from him.  He has advocated using government "nudges", for example to change defaults or opt-in/opt-out options, to get people to make "better" choices that presumably the citizens themselves would prefer.  But if his theory on GMO labeling is right, a "nudge" might very well serve as a signal about what is the appropriate behavior.  Thus, a "nudge" isn't simply changing the default.  It is changing people's preferences, and presumably toward that desired by the regulator/nudger.  Thus, nudges aren't just getting people to make choices that presumably better match their "preference" - it might be very well changing their preference.  I find that problematic both from a philosophical standpoint but also from a public choice perspective.  You can get a sense of why in chapter 4 on behavioral economics in The Food Police.  

A Quasi-Paternalist Takes on Paternalism

Cass Sunstein has a really interesting review of Sarah Conly's new book ​in the New York Times Review of Books.  Conly advocates strongly for paternalism in her book: Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism.  The interesting thing about this review is that Sunstein had a very popular book promoting his own version of paternalism.  Sunstein's version (libertarian paternalism) is admittedly among the least objectionable (though still found several reasons to object in my forthcoming book - the Food Police).  

Here are some of Sunstein's key critiques of Conly's work:​

in my view, she underestimates the possibility that once all benefits and all costs are considered, we will generally be drawn to approaches that preserve freedom of choice. One reason involves the bluntness of coercive paternalism and the sheer diversity of people’s tastes and situations. Some of us care a great deal about the future, while others focus intensely on today and tomorrow. This difference may make perfect sense in light not of some bias toward the present, but of people’s different economic situations, ages, and valuations. Some people eat a lot more than others, and the reason may not be an absence of willpower or a neglect of long-term goals, but sheer enjoyment of food. Our ends are hardly limited to longevity and health; our short-term goals are a large part of what makes life worth living.

​and

Conly favors a paternalism of means, but the line between means and ends can be fuzzy, and there is a risk that well-motivated efforts to promote people’s ends will end up mischaracterizing them.

​and

Freedom of choice is an important safeguard against the potential mistakes of even the most well-motivated officials. Conly heavily depends on cost-benefit analysis . . . Officials may well be subject to the same kinds of errors that concern Conly in the first place. If we embrace cost-benefit analysis, we might be inclined to favor freedom of choice as a way of promoting private learning and reflection, avoiding unjustified costs, and (perhaps more important) providing a safety valve in the event of official errors.

The Economics and Politics of Obesity

That was the title of a talk I gave last week at the University of Alabama-Birmingham in the seminar series run by the Nutrition Obesity Research Center.  I talked about emerging trends associated with obesity (some of which defy popular narratives), the government's role in "combating" obesity, reasons why I find justifications for government action in this area less compelling than many public health professionals, evidence from empirical research on effectiveness of policies designed to "fix" the obesity problem, and finally I concluded with my thoughts on what caused the rise in obesity and what "we" should do about it.  

If you'd like to watch my talk (which runs about 50 minutes), click here.  

Can Behavioral Economics Combat Obesity?

Obesity is a serious health problem. This article demonstrates that using behavioral economics to guide regulations is both misguided and can be counterproductive to obese and nonobese citizens alike.

That's the conclusion of an article in Regulation by Michael Marlow and Sherzod Abdukadirov.  I have a whole chapter in the Food Police on precisely this topic.

What Constitutes a Despotic Government?

What is the worst kind of despotism that can arise from a demographic government?  George Will has some interesting thoughts on these questions in a thought-provoking speech he gave last month (here are Peggy Noonan's thoughts on the speech).  In the talk, Will quotes Tocqueville, and in the process sums up a lot of what I think is wrong with the thinking of the food police (it also reminds me a bit of Jonah Goldberg's Liberal  Fascism).  

Here is Tocqueville in Democracy in America (published in French in 1835):

It would seem that if despotism were to be established among the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild; it would degrade men without tormenting them.

It won't be like the old tyrannies:

I think, then, that the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike anything that ever before existed in the world; our contemporaries will find no prototype of it in their memories. I seek in vain for an expression that will accurately convey the whole of the idea I have formed of it; the old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate: the thing itself is new, and since I cannot name, I must attempt to define it.

Here is the new despotism:

Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?

Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things;it has predisposed men to endure them and often to look on them as benefits.

After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.

The next time you hear that the government should nudge us toward making better decisions, remember Tocqueville's warning of a government that doesn't shatter your will but rather one in which your will is "softened, bent, and guided."  What are we to make of a government that perceives its citizens as needing a shepherd?  It must be one that thinks of its citizens as sheep.