DNA labels

Last week's release of the Food Demand Survey (FooDS) has probably generated as much attention as anything I've put out on this blog.  From my perspective, its hard to know why - I've had longer, more insightful posts, and I've shown similar results in the past (e.g., that people desire avoiding ethylene as much as GMOs).  Part of that just goes to show what a few serendipitous retweets will do for web traffic.  

The issue garnering the attention is the question I added to this month's FooDS asking people (N=1,015; nationwide; demographically weighted to match US population) whether they supported or opposed 10 different food policies.  I was mainly interested in how people responded to the question on mandatory calorie labels on restaurant menus, because that issue has been in the news much of late given the release of the FDA's final rule (and because of the prior research I've worked on with Brenna Ellison on the topic).  But, I often think asking about a single issue in isolation, without much context, isn't particularly insightful.  What's often more interesting are the relative comparisons against other policy issues (or changes over time, which is the main focus of many of the FooDS questions).  Thus, the questions on GMOs, and the question that sparked the most interest: mandatory labels on foods containing DNA.

A few comments.  I do not interpret answers to these sorts of questions as necessarily reflecting some sort of deeply held beliefs, but rather they often represent quick, gut reactions.  As the ballot initiatives in California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington have shown, mandatory GMO labels initially poll at very high levels (at levels similar to what we found in the recent survey), but in all four of those states, labeling failed to garner 50% of the vote.  Clearly, many people's views about mandatory GMO labeling are not fixed constructs, but are (at least at this point) somewhat malleable and are open to education and persuasion.  As such, I do not believe polls of this sort provide "the" answer on whether a policy should pass/fail, but rather provide initial insights for where the conversation will begin.  

There also seemed to be some insinuation that I "tricked" respondents or that the question was leading.  I have a hard time seeing it (were 61% of respondents also led to say that they opposed sugar soda taxes?).  The order of the items was randomized across respondents.  As some commentators have pointed out, the question on DNA labels probably could have been better worded.  It's worded as saying "mandatory labels on foods containing DNA."  So, let's say that you know a lot of foodstuff contains DNA and you want labels on, say, nutritional content, then it could be that you'd say "support" not because you find DNA worrisome but because you want nutritional labels.  I doubt that's how most people interpreted the question, but it's a possibility.  There is ample evidence that the public doesn't understand much about genetics.  For example, back in 1999 in a paper in Science, Gaskell et al. asked true/false questions of the sort, "Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes while genetically modified tomatoes do."  This question has been repeated in many subsequent surveys, and it is often found that many people (incorrectly) say "true".  

I'd be careful about saying this means that people are not smart enough to make their own food decisions (I've written extensively on the topic of paternalism).  I think it mainly implies people don't much need to think about such issues (i.e., they don't have an incentive to think carefully about the issue).  Nonetheless, as I've noted about Kaheman's work, it should make us wary of the availability entrepreneur.  

Finally, I'll noted that I've seen several thoughtful comments on my latest survey.  See, for example, Ilya Somin at the Washington Post or Robbie Gonzalez at i09.        

What is a GMO?

Andrew Pollack had an interesting article in the New York Times yesterday that was ostensibly about companies using various techniques to get around regulations surrounding GMOs.  But, that's not what I think the key point of his article is.  Rather, it emphases exactly how hard it is to define what a "GMO" is and it underscores the lack of precision by opponents of the technology who use the term (and no I'm not referring to the folks shown in the Jimmy Kimmel segment that didn't even know what the acronym stands for).  The article also appropriately raises the issue of the costs and entry barriers that exist with the current regulatory regime (a topic I've previously touched on).  

Here's what I wrote about the definitional difficulties a couple months ago in the Milken Review:   

“Genetic engineering involves the transfer of a gene (or multiple genes) from one species to
another through synthetic means. Just because the process occurs in a lab, it doesn’t follow that the resulting seeds couldn’t have been produced by “natural” means. . . . Resistance to certain herbicides, for example, can also be attained, albeit at a slower rate, via traditional plant breeding. Indeed, many strains of rice grown today are conventionally bred to be resistant to herbicides. Traditional plant breeding requires the breeder to find wild or unusual cultivars that display the trait of interest and repeatedly crossbreed them with a commercial variety until getting an offspring that is similar to the original commercial variety yet exhibits the desired trait.

Genetic engineering, by contrast, attempts to speed up the process by moving only those genes of interest into the commercial variety. Sometimes these genes come from wild
variants of the same species (using so-called cisgenic technology) or from entirely different species (using transgenic technology) [Pollack’s NYT article seems to mainly be about gene editing - turning on and off genes already present in a plant]. As the comparison of cisgenic and transgenic technologies suggest, the dividing line between what is and what is not genetically engineered is fuzzy and somewhat arbitrary: Transgenic is often considered genetic engineering, whereas cisgenic is not, despite the fact that both approaches use the same methods and differ only in the origin of the genes transferred.

Some of the unusual cultivars used in aforementioned conventional crossbreeds are created by mutagenesis – that is, exposing seeds to radiation or to chemicals in hopes of random, beneficial, mutations. This approach has been used for more than half a century and is not considered genetic engineering, nor is it regulated as such. In fact, certified organic
seeds can arise from varieties produced via mutagenesis.”

Then, later in the same article . . .

“Ultimately, it must be recognized that genetically engineered foods are not a single “thing.” To broadly claim that they cause harm lacks precision (not to mention evidence). One needs to tie a specific genetic alteration to a specific type of harm. It is possible to imagine genetic modifications that could trigger allergies (the purely hypothetical example of inserting a peanut gene into corn comes to mind). But most of the commercially used applications on the market today are not of this sort, and new GE crops that were couldn’t pass regulatory muster. ”

Some plant researchers from UC Davis were quoted in Pollack's article as saying,

“the regulatory framework had become “obsolete and an obstacle to the development of new agricultural products.””

GMOs and the Precautionary Principle

Much has been written about Nassim Taleb's coauthored paper arguing that the precautionary principle dictates that we should avoid GMOs.  Given the prominence of the author and his willingness to berate detractors, the paper has received more attention than the ideas in the paper merit.  

This piece by Stuart Hayashi raises an excellent point.  The issue shouldn't be about the presence of risk per se but about risk on the margin.  How much riskier (or less risky) are GMOs compared to other techniques?  As Hayashi point's out, Taleb's argument is akin to running an experiment without the control.  There is an implicit assumption that using GMOs (the experiment) are unambiguously riskier than not (the control).

Hayashi's post had an summary description of Taleb's main argument, which also shows how the same sort of logic can be used to argue that GMOs should be adopted.  I've taken Hayashi's description of Taleb's argument and replaced a few of Hayashi's words with my own in brackets:

"The argument is as follows. If we talk about the risk [likelihood] of a GMO doing damage [creating benefits] on any one particular day, it seems that that risk [potential benefit] is minuscule. But what is the statistical risk[likelihood] of a GMO inflicting harm [being created that creates enormous benefits] one day . . . eventually? As time advances, that risk[likelihood] of a GMO eventually causing turmoil [great good] increases exponentially . . . Therefore, the argument concludes that as long as transgenic technology is employed, it is inevitable that one day, something devastating [wonderful] concerning GMOs will occur. Therefore, the one method whereby we can guard [help secure] ourselves against this otherwise-impending harm [benefit] is to avoid [promote] usage of genetic engineering"

Even if Taleb's argument is right, it must also be right for any number of other possible risks we face: from say, new diseases that come about from interacting with domesticated or wild animals, from risks of using alternative energy sources (curiously, Taleb says nuclear energy is excluded because "the nature of these risks has been extensively studied"), from risks of potentially electing a warmongering despot, from risks of developing robots and artificial intelligence, from risks of comets passing by the earth, from risks of returning from space travel, risks from conventional plant breeding, etc, etc.  It is not an argument that is anyway unique to risks from GMOs.  Maybe Taleb is right and we are all just sitting around waiting for some worldwide disaster.  Even if that's true, I seriously doubt it will be the GMOs that get us.

Vitamins made by GMOs?

At NPR's blog The Salt, Dan Charles has some interesting discussion on the change in the nutritional profile for Cheerios after they went "non-GMO." 

“Remember when Cheerios and Grape-Nuts went GMO-free? That was about a year ago, when their corporate creators announced that these products would no longer contain ingredients made from genetically modified organisms like common types of corn, soybeans or sugar beets.

When they actually arrived on supermarket shelves, though, there was a mysterious change in their list of ingredients. Four vitamins that previously had been added to Grape-Nuts — vitamins A, D, B-12 and B-2 (also known as riboflavin) — were gone. Riboflavin vanished from Cheerios.”

Charles speculates on what caused the change.  One possibility is that some vitamins these days are apparently produced with genetically modified bacteria and yeast.  These microbes can reproduce quickly, and as a result they can efficiently produce vitamin B-12 or riboflavin, if they've got the right genes.  It's a fascinating process that holds much promise in other applications as well.   

Charles ends with what may be an interesting irony for companies who go GMO and maintain the same vitamin content:

“That leaves one method of vitamin production that’s cheap, industrial-scale, and reliably non-GMO: synthetic chemistry. Vitamins are commonly manufactured from scratch in chemical factories, using ingredients that cannot be linked to any genes or biological process at all. That technology may not inspire great affection, but it does, at least, qualify as non-GMO.”

Effects of Plant Variety Protection

New varieties of "self pollinated" crops have, in the past, been released by the public sector.  Self pollinated crops refer to those where farmers can save the seed after harvest, replant next year, and expect to have a new crop that is the same as the previous year (i.e., the "kids" are the same as the "parents").  Wheat is a staple crop that his both "self pollinated" and "inbred."

A lot of the research on wheat breeding has occurred in the public sector because of the belief that it would be difficult for private companies to recoup their investments when farmers can save their seed.  As a result, it is thought that private investment in wheat breeding would be "sub optimal" from a social welfare standpoint.

However, in recent years, a variety of changes have led to public and private companies being able to license new varieties and capture some of the benefits of the improvements in genetics.  Most controversial is the specter of GMO wheat, in which new varieties may have genes protected by intellectual property laws.  Unsurprisingly, some farmers and industry organizations don't like variety protection because it raises the cost of seed.  A cost that was previously borne by all taxpayers is now borne by the smaller group of farmers, millers, and bread consumers.  

A new paper in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics by Russell Thomson studies the effect of the introduction of new plant variety protection laws in Australia that allowed breeders to capture royalties on their new varieties. Thomson argues that the protection laws in Australia are "stronger" than in the US - giving breeders greater potential returns to their investments.

I have to admit that the findings are not what I would have expected.  Thomson writes: 

“The results indicate that varieties released by royalty-funded breeders are less valuable than those released by breeders operating under the alternative, prereform regime. The data provide no evidence that the transition to royalty-funded breeding is associated with an increase in the rate of variety release. Taken together, these findings suggest that the reform led to a fall in breeder output relative to what would have otherwise been the case. This statistical analysis is supplemented with a series of semistructured interviews with senior scientists, who were employed at Australian breeding programs over the period of reform. This qualitative evidence suggests that the fall in breeder output was caused by a combination of fewer research spillovers, lower release standards, and a possible fall in total investment in breeding. Analysis presented in this article suggests that plant variety protection alone does not ensure socially optimal breeding outcomes in the case of open-pollinated varieties.”

It is a little unclear whether this paper (which compares outcomes before and after a reform) is picking up the effect of the change in the law or some other secular trend.  Could it be the case that breeder output was falling everywhere even outside Australia (perhaps all the low hanging fruit had already been picked)?  The paper also doesn't tell us much (beyond anecdote) about whether total investment (public and private) in wheat breeding was steady or falling in real terms over this time period.  We also aren't told whether there were changes in how breeders who remained in the public sector were compensated after the law change.  Nonetheless, this is an interesting paper that should provoke more research in the area.