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Effects of Prop 12 in California

Back in November 2018, 63% of California poll-goers voted in favor of Proposition 12. The effect of the passage of Prop 12 is to require shell eggs sold in the state to come from cage free production systems. For pork, Prop 12 would impose certain space requirements and effectively ban the use of some housing practices like gestation crates. Prop 12 was slated to take effect on Jan. 1, 2022.

Prior to implementation, many good economic studies were conducted to estimate the potential impacts of Prop 12 on the prices and consumption of eggs and pork in California. For example, this excellent paper by Sohae Eve Oh and Tom Vukina, which was just released by the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, projected that because of Prop 12 in California, “the new marginal costs of what used to be conventional eggs would increase, on average, by 56%. The prices of originally conventional eggs would increase by 65%.” Other studies by Barry Goodwin and by Dan Sumner and Rich Sexton and by Christine McCraken have provide estimates of the cost of Prop 12 on the pork industry.

Now that January 1, 2022 has come and past, what’s actually happening?

For eggs, it appears that the rules around Prop 12 have taken place and are in force. To get a sense of what impact the policy is having, I took a look at the data reported by the USDA in the National Shell Index Price Report. Because the report lists 5-day rolling averages of wholesale prices, I looked at the Friday report of egg prices in California and for the U.S. for the weeks just before and after the first of the year.

Unsurprisingly egg prices in California are higher than in the rest of the U.S. What’s more relevant to the debate around Prop 12 is how that price premium has changed. The average gap between California and U.S. egg prices jumped from 70 cents/dozen prior to Jan 1st to 142 cents/dozen after Jan 1st. As we and others have done in other studies of the effects of prior California egg policies (e.g., see here, here, or here), we can calculate the so-called difference-in-difference, which in this case amounts to 142-70=72 cents/dozen.

That is, California egg prices are 72 cents/dozen more expensive after the 1st of the year than they would have been if the California price-premium had staid at 2021 levels. The California premium jumped 103%. If I apply this changed to premium to the average national egg prices after the 1st of the year, it implies an increase in egg prices in California of about 85%. Why is this observed jump (85%) higher than the projections by Oh and Vukina (65%)? Hard to know, but as Dan Sumner pointed out in a comment on my paper with Conner Mullally on the effects of a prior California animal welfare regulation, legal and regulatory uncertainty can have effects above and beyond the direct effect of the policy itself. Whatever the causes, the evidence here suggests Prop 12 is having significant price impacts on the prices of eggs in California, at least in the initial month following implementation.

Speaking of regulatory uncertainty, let’s turn now to pork. It appears implementation of Prop 12 for pork has been put on hold for at least a few months because the state of California has yet to release final rules, and a state judge pushed off enforcement until final rules are released. So for now, we’ll have to satisfy ourselves with the aforementioned ex ante projections of the potential impacts of the policy on pork prices. For what it’s worth, here’s a slide I prepared for a talk yesterday where I used some of the previous pork demand estimates from an analysis with Glynn Tonsor, coupled with an economic model, to project potential of Prop 12 if it is conceptualized as a tax.

Finally, in case you missed it, my University President, Mitch Daniels, recently weighed in on Prop 12 in an op-ed in the Washington Post.

How people cognitively group different foods

I ran across this interesting ethnographic study of how people conceptualize different foods. It’s a small sample of only 27 people, so one might take the results with a grain of salt, but nonetheless, I found the following figure interesting. The results are from a “pile sorting” exercise where people were asked to group 42 different foods in terms of their similarity to one another in as many groups as they wanted.

Source: Fox, E.L., Davis, C., Downs, S.M., McLaren, R. and Fanzo, J., 2021. A focused ethnographic study on the role of health and sustainability in food choice decisions. Appetite, p.105319.

Source: Fox, E.L., Davis, C., Downs, S.M., McLaren, R. and Fanzo, J., 2021. A focused ethnographic study on the role of health and sustainability in food choice decisions. Appetite, p.105319.

I thought it was interesting that plant-based burgers and milk were neither classified as “meat” or “dairy” or “plant” but in categories of their own; by contrast the in-vitro meat burger was closer to the meat category.

They also found that:

the most salient considerations cited by our participants were price, health, taste, and time.

These findings are consistent with the broad literature on food values; I should note that we have published several papers in the past where we asked larger samples of consumers to rate and rank different foods along multiple dimensions (e.g., here, here, or here)

Slump in Sales of Meat Alternatives

A few days ago, Beyond Meat released their quarterly earnings report and indicated lower than expected profits and sales, leading to a tumble in the firm’s stock price. On Twitter, Julian Melletin noted the firm lost $1.25 for every $1 sold, and he showed some interesting data on the history of sales over the past few years.

Beyond Meat is just one company, and it would a mistake to take these headlines and draw broad conclusions about the market trends surrounding plant-based meat alternatives. After all, Beyond Meat might be losing sales because of new entrants and competition to this space.

There isn’t good public data available on sales of meat alternatives, but IRI (a purveyor of grocery store scanner data) has released a series of interesting dashboards showing aggregate trends in a variety of grocery categories, including meat and meat alternatives. Here is what their data imply about total sales meats and meat alternatives.

Derived from IRI data at https://indices.iriworldwide.com/covid19/?i=0

Derived from IRI data at https://indices.iriworldwide.com/covid19/?i=0

The figure above suggest the downward trend in meat alternative sales extends beyond Beyond Meat. For example, in the week ending October 31, 2021, sales of alternative meats were down 7% relative to the same week last year in 2020. By contrast, sales of beef are up 5%, chicken up 6%, pork up 8%, and turkey up a whopping 38%.

In addition to reporting sales, IRI also reports changes in prices.

Derived from IRI data at https://indices.iriworldwide.com/covid19/?i=0

Whereas prices of traditional meat items are all up 10% or more relative to the same time last year, the same isn’t true of meat alternatives. Indeed, despite all the headlines about overall food price inflation, the price of meat alternatives is actually lower now than it was a year prior.

The two figures above indicate: 1) prices of meat alternatives is down and 2) sales of meat alternatives are down. Taken together, these two facts are strong evidence that demand (i.e., consumers’ willingness-to-pay) for meat alternatives has fallen.

Why is demand for meat alternatives down relative to the same time last year? It isn’t entirely clear. However, note the data above relate only to grocery store sales. It is possible demand is up in the restaurant sector; however, at least in the grocery store, demand for meat alternatives is down. Moreover, the phenomenon can’t be explained by an overall reduction in grocery sales because sales of other meat items is, in fact, now higher than was the case at the same time last year.

Testimony before the US House of Representatives

Earlier today I testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee. The topic was "State of the Beef Supply Chain: Shocks, Recovery, and Rebuilding." Links to hearing and written testimonies of the four witnesses can be found here.

My written testimony is reproduced below (or, if it’s easier to read, in this pdf).

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Chairman Costa, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. I am a food and agricultural economist and I serve as Distinguished Professor and Head of the Agricultural Economics Department at Purdue University.

I will begin by providing some background on some of the economic factors that have contributed to the volatility in cattle and beef markets in recent years. Then, I will shift my focus to three economic issues currently facing the beef cattle industry: packing capacity and resiliency, price discovery, and the importance of trade and innovation.

For the past couple years, beef and cattle markets have been extraordinarily turbulent and volatile. Major events include the loss of a major packing plant to fire in 2019, demand-induced disruptions from COVID-19 resulting from the decline in restaurant spending and the spike in grocery spending, supply-induced disruption from COVID-19 resulting from the worker illnesses in packing plants, increasing feed prices, drought in the West, and recently, increased Chinese imports and cyber-attacks. Only one other year in the past 30 has witnessed more volatility in live fed cattle prices than 2020. Consumers likewise experienced significant price shocks. Retail beef prices increased 25% year-over-year price in June 2020 before falling 3% year-over-year in May 2021.

When trying to understand the current challenges, some historical perspective is warranted. Over the past decade, cattle inventories have followed a V-shaped pattern. Corresponding cattle prices have followed an inverse V-shaped pattern. From 2010 to 2015, total number of commercial cattle slaughtered fell by more than 16%. The decline resulted from producers cutting inventory as a result of a dramatic increase in feed prices and a drought in some parts of the Midwest. The change in cattle numbers affected the packing sector. There was, at the time, too much packing capacity relative to the number of cattle, and returns to cattle processing took a hit. Some small and medium packers exited because it was no longer profitable, and some large packers shuddered plants in an attempt to align capacity with inventory.

The high levels of capacity relative to cattle numbers, coupled with strong demand, led to a rise in cattle prices. Following a common cyclical pattern (the “cattle cycle”), producers retained heifers and expanded their herds to capture the benefits of higher prices that were experienced in 2014 and 2015. By 2019, total commercial cattle slaughter had increased 16.7% relative to the 2015 low. The packing sector, having adjusted to a smaller herd size, now found itself in the opposite position: there was a high number of cattle relative to processing capacity, which put downward pressure on cattle prices. It was against this backdrop that we experienced the unexpected fire, pandemic, and cyber-attack that further exacerbated the effects of limited capacity. If these unexpected events had occurred in 2014 or 2015, the impacts on producers would have been much different.

There is a key lesson to take from this recent historical episode. There are long lags and ripple effects in cattle and beef markets. A producer makes a decision today to breed a cow, and it will be roughly three years till the resulting offspring is ready for market. Likewise, investors today decide to build a new packing plant. It will be years before construction is finished and the capacity is brought online. Everyone is betting on the future with information that ultimately be two to three years old by the time outcomes are realized. Cattle inventories have already started to fall, and cattle prices have risen since last summer. My recommendation to you, as policy makers, is the following: do not overly focus on what is happening today. Consider what will be needed 3 to 5 years from now. Market participants adapt to changing circumstances, although sometimes more slowly than we’d like because of biological and construction lags, but policy ideally should focus on longer-run forces that improve the well-being of producers and consumers in an industry.

With that backdrop, I will move on to the first of three current issues facing the industry. There are a number of state and federal initiatives to increase processing capacity. As previously, noted, processing capacity in 2020, even if the pandemic hadn’t occurred, was likely to be “tight,” which contributed to downward pressure on cattle prices. We appear, however, to be in a different phase of the cattle cycle. Cattle inventory is falling. Feed prices are rising. There is a drought in West. These factors will, over time, likely bring cattle numbers closer in line with current capacity. Moreover, even absent federal investments, there are a number of private initiatives to increase automation and add more packing capacity. More capacity, and fewer cattle, will help support future cattle prices. But, as the experience of the past decade has revealed, that will not be the end of the story. Whether we are setting ourselves up, in five years' time, for another situation in the packing sector like the one experienced in 2014 and 2015 remains to be seen. Additional government investments in capacity, for the purpose of improving cattle prices, may be fixing yesterday’s problem.

There is another argument being made for adding capacity: improving resiliency to the sector. Extra capacity could be seen as a form of insurance against unexpected capacity reductions from events like fire, pandemic, or cyber-attack. COVID-19 infections led to and dramatic reduction the nation’s beef slaughter capacity. There was little excess capacity in the system and nowhere for market-ready cattle to go. My research with Purdue colleague Meilin Ma indicates that even if we would have had a more distributed packing sector consisting of more small and medium sized plants instead of a small number of large plants, the price spread dynamics and beef supply disruptions would not have likely have been appreciably different than what we witnessed. The problem at the time was not the size or localness of the plants but total industry capacity.

However, excess capacity is expensive, and it is in no individual packer’s interest to routinely operate at significantly reduced capacity. Imagine approaching an investor asking for tens of millions of dollars with a plan to only operate a facility at only 50% capacity. Few bankers would agree to such a deal. Support for subsidizing additional processing capacity might be justified on public insurance grounds, but ultimately, the ebbs and flows of the cattle cycle will determine the long-run size of the packing industry, and newly subsidized plants will be at an advantage over older existing plants when cattle numbers come back in line with capacity and ultimate profitability determines the size of the packing sector. Support for small and local processors might benefit local economic ecosystems and increase custom harvest operations for producers, but these operations, because they lack economies of scale, must focus on quality and service to be competitive, and are such a small part of the national industry that investments at this size are unlikely to significantly alter the aggregate industry capacity. It is also worth noting that costs of adding packing capacity are not limited to concrete and iron. I encourage you to consider other costs and barriers that limit new entrants thus expanded capacity. Availability of labor has been a significant challenge for the industry and labor constraints put a limit on processing capacity. Other factors include the costs of complying with federal, state, and local regulations related to labor, food safety, zoning, transportation, and more.

Second, in light of the relatively low cattle prices experienced in 2020, there have been a number of proposals to affect the marketing of cattle. One set of concerns has focused on the share of cattle sold on a negotiated or cash basis. While the share of cattle sold in this manner, roughly 20%, has not changed much since the high-cattle-price era experienced in 2014 and 2015, it is lower than was the case a decade ago. Cattle sold on a formula basis often utilize the negotiated, cash price as a base. Thus, trades on a relatively small number of cattle influence the price for a much larger number of formula-priced cattle. A concern has emerged as to whether there are enough trades in the cash market to truly reflect market fundamentals. In efforts to improve price discovery, an important distinction needs to be made: price levels and price volatility. Even if all cattle were traded on a negotiated, cash basis, the price level would not necessarily improve; however, we might be more confident that any given transaction would be reflective of the “true” underlying supply and demand conditions at the time and location. Whether, in fact, there are too few cash transactions to reflect market fundamentals is debatable.

Attempting to mandate more cattle be sold in a negotiated, cash basis has potential benefits and certain costs. The fact that most producers and packers choose to sell cattle using alternative marketing arrangements suggests they see benefits in this form of marketing in the form of increased certainty, lower transactions costs, and supply chain coordination. Mandating a certain percent of cattle be sold on a negotiated basis would entail some producers and packers foregoing a marketing method they currently find more desirable. That is a cost. Moreover, strengthening of consumer demand for beef over the past couple decades has occurred over a period in which there was increased use of formula pricing that rewarded quality improvements. Eroding the ability of consumers, retailers, and packers to incentivize quality through formulas and vertical coordination may have detrimental impacts on demand.

The best economic case for mandating more negotiated transactions rests on the argument that price discovery is a public good. Are there less costly ways to improve price discovery than a mandate? Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is one tool that has improved price transparency and discovery. Continued research into improvements in this legislation might further facilitate price discovery. Taxes to avoid, or subsidies to use, negotiated cash markets are seldom mentioned despite having similar economic intuition as a mandate. Even if a mandate were pursued, it might be made more efficient if coupled with a “cap and trade” system, where obligations to secure cattle in a cash market might be bought and sold in a secondary “offset” market similar to what currently exists for fuel manufactures mandated to blend a given amount of biofuels. Including negotiated grid or formula transactions in a mandate would also lessen the costs of the policy. It is important to consider solutions that may be less costly and restrictive than a mandate because the cattle industry is constantly evolving and needs to remain cost-competitive with other animal- and plant-proteins to have a place on consumers’ dinner plates.

I will conclude with an encouragement to focus on policies that improve the health of the entire industry. Discussions of cattle prices and packing capacity can give the impression that beef and cattle markets represent a zero-sum game. But, one party’s gain does not have to come at the expense of another. What policies increase the size of the pie available to all participants: cow-calf producers, backgrounders, feedlots, packers, retailers, and ultimately, consumers?

As witnessed in recent months, improved trade relations have the ability improve economic circumstances for multiple segments of the industry. The U.S. exports about 12% of beef production. Trade agreements are important to help open markets for U.S. producers to allow products to flow to consumers who value them most.

Investments in research and innovation that increase demand or improve productivity are likely a net win for consumers, producers, and the environment. Had we not innovated since 1970, about 11 million more feedlot cattle would have been needed to produce the amount of beef U.S. consumers actually enjoyed last year. Innovation and technology saved the extra land, water, and feed that these cattle would have required, as well as the waste and greenhouse gases that they would have emitted. Investments in research to improve the productivity of livestock and poultry can improve producer profitability, consumer affordability, and the sustainability for food supply chain.

Despite the challenges of the past couple years, the beef cattle system responded remarkably well to a series of large, unexpected disruptions. Producer prices have been on the rise. Consumer demand is strong. These core facts should remain front of mind when considering changes that would significantly affect the cattle industry going forward.

Beef, Chicken, and Carbon Emissions

There seems to be rising attention paid to the environmental impacts of meat consumption. Some people see plant-based meat alternatives as one way to address this concern, and they question whether it is possible to see a big shift in the types of “meat” consumers buy. Such a shift, in fact, has occurred over the past fifty years - a period during which we’ve observed a remarkable change in meat consumption patterns.

The figure below shows US per-capita consumption (lbs/person/year) of beef and chicken from 1970 to 2020 based on USDA data. On a retail-weight basis, per capita consumption of beef fell from an annual average of 86 lbs/person in the 1970s to 56.7 lbs/person in 2010s (i.e., from 2010 to 2019) - a 34% reduction. At the same time, chicken consumption went from 38.9 lbs in the 1970s to 86.9 lbs in the 2010s - a 123% increase. Total consumption of these two meats has increased from an annual average of 124.8 lbs in the 1970s to 143.5 lbs in the 2010s.

meatconsumption.JPG

Using the per-capita consumption data (expressed instead on a carcass rather than retail basis), coupled with additional USDA data on yield (lbs produced per animal) over time, one can infer the number of animals each person in the U.S. eats each year on average.

In the 1970s, the average American ate 14.5 chickens/year, a figure that increased to 22.3 chickens by the 2010s. In the 1970s, the average American ate 0.19 cows/year, a figure that fell to only 0.1 cows/year in the 2010s. Stated differently, it took about 5.3 years for the average American to eat one whole cow in the 1970s; at today’s consumption levels, it takes nearly a decade before the average American eats a whole cow.

What is the impact of this consumption pattern change from beef to chicken on one key environmental measure: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ?

One UN Food and Agricultural Organization study indicates that there are 5.4 kg of CO2 equivalent gasses emitted for every kg of carcass weight of chicken meat produced. USDA data indicate the average carcass weight of U.S. broilers over the past decade is about 4.53 lbs/bird (or 2.06 kg/bird). This means, each bird is associated with 11.1 kg of C02. Because consumers are now eating 22.3-14.5 = 7.9 more chickens each year than they were in the 1970s, this means they are also emitting 7.9*11.1 = 87.3 kg more CO2 than in the 1970s (assuming the per-head chicken emissions haven’t changed over time).

Has the reduction in beef consumption been enough to offset the increases in carbon emissions from the increased consumption of chicken? According to one study, roughly 22 kg of CO2 are emitted for every kg of carcass weight of beef produced. Cattle carcass weights have averaged about 804.7 lbs/head (or 365.8 kg/head) for the past decade, meaning each cow generates 8,047 kg of CO2 equivalent gasses. Because U.S. consumers are now eating 0.19-0.1 = 0.09 fewer cows each year than in the 1970s, they are emitting 0.09*8047 = 705.6 fewer kg of CO2 equivalent gasses from beef consumption (again, assuming the per-head beef emissions haven’t changed over time). Some of this reduction is because people are consuming less beef (per-capita consumption feel from 116 lbs to 81 lbs on a carcass weight basis), but also because cattle yields have substantially increased from about 617 lbs/cow in the 1970s to 804.7 in the 2010s) - we are getting more beef from each head of cattle.

So, the average American is emitting 87.3 more kg CO2 from extra chicken consumption but has cut 705 kg CO2 from less beef consumption since the 1970s. Looks like a net carbon win. And one that isn’t even close.

One pushback to this point may be that there are more people today than in the 1970s, so per-capita numbers may be misleading. Throughout the 1970s, the US population averaged 215 million, whereas in the 2010s, population averaged 319.6 million. Taking this into consideration, in aggregate, calculations suggest Americans are today consuming about 4 billion more chickens and 8.3 million fewer cattle than in the 1970s. Using the aforementioned per-head emissions implies we are, in aggregate, emitting 44.7 million metric tons (MMT) more CO2 from extra chickens but 67.1 less MMT CO2 from fewer cattle. Thus, on net, we are emitting 22.4 MMT fewer CO2 equivalent gasses from our aggregate beef and chicken consumption today than in the 1970s. Thus, it still appears a net carbon “win” even adjusting for population change.

While we’re at it, the data used in the above calculations can be used to ask a number of counter factional questions.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if we hadn’t increased productivity (or yield) since the 1970s? Answer: 52.7 MMT more CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if population staid at 1970s levels? Answer: 25.9 MMT less CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from chicken be if per-capita consumption staid at 1970’s levels? Answer: 48.4 MMT less CO2.

Now the same questions for beef.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if we hadn’t increased productivity (or yield) since the 1970s? Answer: 78.73 MMT more CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if population staid at 1970s levels? Answer: 84.67 MMT less CO2.

  • What would today’s aggregate GHG emissions from beef be if per-capita consumption staid at 1970’s levels? Answer: 112.57 MMT more CO2.

To give some sense of scale, the EPA GHG inventory data suggests all U.S. agriculture was responsible for 628 MMT CO2 equivalent emissions in 2019.

All in all, it seems meat consumption patterns have become much more carbon friendly since the 1970s - that’s not a headline one often sees.

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Note: One assumption in all the above calculations is that the CO2 emissions per head for both chicken and beef haven’t changed over time. While these factors have no doubt changed, it seems unlikely that they have changed enough over time to overturn the basic beef/chicken comparisons above, but I highlight it here to note that the magnitudes are uncertain. Moreover, I’ve converted measures to a per-head (rather than per pound produced) metric because it strikes me that GHG impacts primarily depend on the size of the animal inventory, and if we can get more meat from each animal in the same amount of time (say, from improved genetics), that wouldn’t necessarily imply greater GHG emissions. All my calculations are in this spreadsheet if someone wants to check me.

Finally, thanks to Jack Bobo who asked me some questions, which prompted the writing of this post.