Farmer's Share of the Retail Dollar - Enough Already

Every so often, the people seem to get excited about the farmer’s share of the retail dollar – particularly when USDA updates the figures or a news article mentions the issue.  A couple months ago, for example, the National Farmer’s Union issued a press release decrying the fact that farmers “only” receive 14.8 cents of every dollar consumers spend on food.  About the same time, the Food Tank put out this tweet.

For every dollar consumers spend on food, only 7.8 cents goes to farmers pic.twitter.com/NZrqJ6OVsw

— Food Tank (@foodtank) May 15, 2018

The widespread implication seems to be that a lower share of the retail dollar is an unambiguous sign that farmers are worse off.  But one has very little to do with the other.  Let me try to illustrate with an example.   

Suppose there are two countries where the farmer’s share of the retail dollar differs dramatically.  In Country A, the share is only 10% and in Country B, the share is 90%.  So, when a consumer spends $1 on food, the farmer in Country A receives 10 cents and the farmer in Country B receives 90 cents.  On a dollar-spent-on-food basis, it thus looks like a farmer would much prefer to live in Country B than Country A.  But, let’s dig a little deeper.

Suppose the farmers in our two countries actually produce the same value of agricultural output.  To make the math easy, let’s say farmers in Country A produce $100 billion worth of ag output and farmers in Country B do the same. 

What are consumers in the two countries spending on food?  By definition, consumers in Country A are spending $100 billion/0.1 = $1,000 billion and consumers in country B are only spending $100 billion/0.9 = $111.11 billion. By definition, for a fixed value of ag output, a smaller value for the farmer's share of the retail dollar implies a larger total food economy. As I'll show in a minute, it matters a lot if you're selling into a $1 trillion market or a $111 billion market.

Why might consumers in Country A spend so much more on food than consumers in Country B despite the same volume of ag output in both countries?  Well, it could be there is more market power with greedy agribusinesses and retailers siphoning off profits in Country A than B (that seems to be the common layman’s interpretation).  But, it could also be that consumers in Country A have the preferences or ability to pay more for better packaging, increased food safety, better working conditions in food processing, more convenience (they pay the processor or a restaurant to do more of the preparation for them), etc.

So, what happens if there is a 10% increase in consumer demand for food in both Country A and Country B?  This could happen, for examples, if the populations increase in each country or if the respective food industries run advertisements or there are post-farm innovations that increase quality. 

Now, let’s construct a very simple economic model (such as the one we use in this paper), where, in both countries, the elasticity of demand is -0.8 and the elasticity of supply is 0.2, and the farm product is supplied to the retail sector in fixed proportions. 

In this situation, a 10% increase in consumer demand in country A (with only a 10% farmer’s share of the retail dollar) will increase farmers' profits by $29 billion.  However, in country B, where farmers “get” a full 90% of the retail dollar, that same 10% increase in consumer demand only increases farmers' profits by $8.8 billion.  So, for the same percentage increase in consumer demand, farmers in country A are more than 3x better off than farmers in country B despite the fact that their share of the retail dollar is only 10% instead of 90%. 

So, here’s a fundamental lesson: a small share of a big number can be much higher than a larger share of a smaller number.

Now, none of this means that one cannot construct scenarios in which producers are worse off when the farmer’s share of the retail dollar falls.  That’s easy to do too.  But, as I’ve shown here, I can easily do the opposite. 

The point?  Changes in the farmer’s share of the retail dollar are meaningless insofar as telling us whether farmers are better or worse off. 

Don't believe me?  Listen to other agricultural economists.  Here is Gary Brester, John Marsh, and Joseph Atwood and colleagues writing in a 2009 journal article:

“We have empirically demonstrated that [the farmer’s share of the retail dollar] statistics and, by construction, farm-to-retail marketing margins, are not reliable measures of changes in producer surplus (welfare) given exogenous shocks to various economic factors … In fact, little or no accurate information is conveyed by [farmer’s share of the retail dollar] statistics … Consequently, these data should not be used for policy purposes.”

My New TEDx Talk on Animal Agriculture and Animal Welfare

A couple months ago, I was asked to give a talk at a TEDx event put on at Purdue University.  The video is finally available online.  I talked about the evolution of animal agriculture and the impacts on food prices and animal welfare, and I ended with my proposal for an animal welfare market, which I've previously written about here and here.

Recently there has been a strong push for better treatment of produce animals. Jason's talk asks whether society is ready to pay the price for the better treatment and if the better treatment society is pushing for really increases the animal's standard of living.

Agricultural Marketing and Price Analysis

About 10 years ago, Bailey Norwood and I published an undergraduate textbook entitled Agricultural Marketing and Price Analysis.  The book was originally published by Prentice-Hall. Over the years, we'd considered revising and updating various portions of the book, but the publishers were never appeared interested in releasing a second edition.    

Now, Waveland Press was secured the rights to publish the textbook (their site for the book is here).  For now, this is just a reprint of our original version, but they've agreed to put out a new edition in the future as well.  Bailey and I will probably pick up a couple co-authors who have been using the book in class.  More on that in a year or two when a new edition is set to drop. 

For now, you can enjoy the new cover.

Or, if you can read Greek, you can also buy that translation here. 

How to Feed the World

That's the title of a new book edited by Jessica Eise and Ken Foster that was just released last week.  The book is a collection of essays primarily from my colleagues in the Department of Agricultural Economics here at Purdue, but it includes contributions from Purdue faculty in other academic disciplines as well.  I had the privilege of writing the afterward.  

Here is the table of contents:

Chapter 1. Inhabitants of Earth- Brigitte S Walforf
Chapter 2. The Green, Blue, and Gray Water Rainbow- Laura C Bowling and Keith A Cherkauer
Chapter 3. The Land that Shapes and Sustains Us- Otto Doering and Ann Sorensen
Chapter 4. Our Changing Climate- Jeff Dukes and Thomas W Hertel
Chapter 5. The Technology Ticket- Uris Baldos
Chapter 6. Systems- Michael Gunderson, Ariana Torres, Michael Boehlje, and Rhonda Phillips
Chapter 7. Tangled Trade- Thomas W Hertel
Chapter 8. Spoiled, Rotten, and Left Behind- Ken Foster
Chapter 9. Tipping the Scales on Health- Steven Y Wu
Chapter 10. Social License to Operate- Nicole J Olynk Widmar
Chapter 11. The Information Hinge- Jessica Eise
Chapter 12. Achieving Equal Access- Gerald Shively

Gains to Chinese Agricultural Research and Extension

Last week, Nature published this piece on a massive study conducted by Chinese agricultural researchers.  Accompanying the piece was a summary/editorial describing the study:

“Running from 2005 to 2015, the project first assessed how factors including irrigation, plant density and sowing depth affected agricultural productivity. It used the information to guide and spread best practice across several regions: for example, recommending that rice in southern China be sown in 20 holes densely packed in a square metre, rather than the much lower densities farmers were accustomed to using.

The results speak for themselves: maize (corn), rice and wheat output grew by some 11% over that decade, whereas the use of damaging and expensive fertilizers decreased by between 15% and 18%, depending on the crop. Farmers spent less money on their land and earned more from it — and they continue to do so.”

The project appears to have created substantial economic benefits.  The authors of the study write:

“Direct profit, calculated from increased grain output and reduced nitrogen fertilizer use, was US$12.2 billion (Table 1), which does not include relevant environmental benefits associated with reductions in reactive nitrogen losses and in GHG emissions. On the basis of the rough estimates, the cost:benefit ratio would be 1:226. ”

The cost-benefit ratio is in some ways over- and in other ways under-estimated.  The benefits are over-estimated in the sense that it does not appear it takes into consideration the fact that greater grain production will dampen prices (it is also unclear how the benefits and costs are discounted or not over time).  The benefits are under-estimated because they do not include any of the environmental improvements.  

It is useful to contrast these findings with the rather large research on the value of agricultural R&D and extension investments in the U.S.  Jin and Huffman calculated the rate of return on spending on agricultural extension in the U.S. at 100%.  More broadly, Julian Alston gave the fellow's address at this this year's AAEA meetings on precisely this topic, and his remarks were recently published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  He writes:

“Our estimates (Alston et al. 2010a, 2011) indicate that U.S. federal and state government expenditure on agricultural research and extension generates benefit-cost ratios of at least 10:1 (more likely 20:1 or 30:1)—evidence of a serious underinvestment. Pardey and Beddow (2017), echoing Pardey, Alston, and Chan-Kang (2013), suggested that a reasonable first step would be to double U.S. public investment in agricultural R&D—an increase of, say, $4 billion over recent annual expenditures. A conservatively low benefit-cost ratio of 10:1 implies that having failed to spend that additional $4 billion per year on public agricultural R&D imposes a net social cost of $36 billion per year”

Given the lower level of development in China, it is certainly possible to imagine that the rate of return on investments in agricultural research and extension being higher than is the case in the U.S.  But, can the benefit cost ration really be 10 times higher in China than the U.S. (226:1 vs. 20:1)?  One interesting thing about Chinese study in Nature is that, if I read correctly, it didn't entail development of any new genetics, pesticides, etc; rather it seemed to largely entail the application of previously developed "science" and practices to the particular geographies in question, and as such, the costs might have been much lower than in situations where new technologies are being created. 

In a sense, the shows an enormously high value to "better information."  This contrasts with perspectives such as this one by David Pannell, who argues that better technologies are much more impactful than "better information."  One way to reconcile this seeming paradox is that that the "information" conveyed to the Chinese farmers was to use better technologies and practices that were already known to exist.  Here in the developed world, the knowledge/technologies are likely already more widely dispersed.  

I'll end with this quote from Alston's paper, who articulated the value of increased productivity in a createive way:

“Clearly agricultural productivity growth is enormously valuable. Of the actual farm output in 2007, worth about $330 billion, only one-third (i.e., 100/280 = 0.36) or about $118 billion could be accounted for by conventional inputs using 1949 technology, holding productivity constant. The remaining two-thirds (i.e., 180/280 = 0.64) or about $212 billion in that year alone, is attributable to the factors that gave rise to a 180% increase in productivity since 1949—including improvements in infrastructure and inputs (if not captured already in the indexes), as well as new technology, developed and adopted as a result of agricultural research and extension, and other sources of innovations.”