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The Hidden Cost of Cheap Food

The "food movement" has a long and varied history, but it seems to me that much of the force behind the modern calls for action came from writings during the early to mid-2000s (think Supersize Me or Fast Food Nation or Omnivore's Dilemma or Food Politics, which ultimately lead to more recent things like Food Inc and Salt Sugar Fat and Pandora's Lunchbox).   

The interesting thing about this time period is that food commodity prices were historically very low.  As a result, a common mantra developed that goes something like the following.  Food is too cheap.  This cheap food masks costs to health and the environment.  These masked costs represent externalities, and economics tells us that externalities justify government action like food taxes, subsidies, etc.  This line of thinking reached such a level that the CDC and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies has held a couple meetings on the issue (I participated in one of those; more on that in a moment).   

There are two problems with this like of reasoning.  First, in the US, we witnessed extraordinarily run-ups in commodity prices in 2008 and again in 2011.  Worldwide, food prices are higher today in real terms than has been the case for almost 40 years (e.g., see this UN FAO graph).  One might argue that certain types of foods are "too cheap" but to broadly make such a claim is no longer consistent with the facts.  Second, I think outside circles of trained economists, there is often a deep misunderstanding of the nature of externalities, and even within economic circles a lack of critical thinking about the ability of taxes/subsidies to solve externality problems.  

This second point was the focus of an invited talk that I gave to the Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association this summer in Ithaca, NY.  That address has been published in the association's journal, the Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.  The paper is now available online.  

Here is the abstract:

Social critics have taken aim at modern production agriculture using a common theme: many food, health, and environmental problems are explained by corporate farms, agribusinesses, and fast-food restaurants failing to account for the full costs of their actions. How accurate is this diagnosis? How feasible is the assumption that these externalities are most effectively mitigated via Pigovian taxes and subsidies? Drawing on my experiences at a National Institute of Medicine meeting on the subject, I seek to clarify the definition and nature of externalities and discuss situations in which public policy is most and least effective in efficiently making "hidden” costs of food visible.

A few snippets:

One of the striking observations that emerged from the conference was
the wide disconnect between the views held by participating economists
and noneconomists about the nature and role of externalities. Among many of the noneconomists, it seemed that any “bad” outcome that resulted from food production and consumption—heart attacks, obesity, the low pay of slaughterhouse workers, soil run-off, animal welfare problems, climate change— was evidence of an externality that required regulation, typically in the form of some sort of tax. I also learned in the process that some of my views about externalities were perhaps a bit unorthodox relative to those of other economists.

and

Clearly, the case for regulating externalities is more complicated than first
meets the eye. Indeed, as the preceding examples illustrate, one is apt to
see externalities everywhere. The sheer abundance of examples that fit the definition of “externality” coupled with our unwillingness to tax them all
away is suggestive. As Coase put it, “The ubiquitous nature of ‘externalities’ suggests to me that there is a prima facie case against intervention”

and I start the conclusions with the following:

This essay arose from my failed attempts to explain externalities to
noneconomists and my desire to challenge fellow economists to think more seriously about the real-world implications of policy advice derived from simple textbook models. In popular writing about food and agriculture, there seems to be a lack of appreciation for the types of externalities that reduce welfare and of the difficulty associated with crafting corrective actions that actually increase the size of the pie. Moreover, the concept of externality is often used to advance a particular cause or point of view. There is a lot of talk about the “hidden costs” of our modern food production system. What about the “hidden benefits?” Failing even to mention, let alone seriously address, that question suggests that one is not willing to think seriously about externalities as anything more than academic-sounding justifications designed to garner enough power and support to enact a faction’s preferred policy.

I learned a lot writing the essay, I hope readers might learn something too.

Old fashioned winemaking meets new technology

The Economist has a fascinating article on the use of new farm and food technologies in the wine industry.  The developments are interesting for two reasons. First is that wine making and drinking is, for many people, the embodiment of artisinal and "natural".  Second, many of the technological developments are coming out of France, which might actually help adoption.  

Here are a few interesting segments:

Now, however, the stigma of automation is declining, and more prestigious producers have become open to the use of technology in winemaking. That has prompted inventors to devise new machines to meet their exacting needs. Because consumers remain seduced by the notion that wine should be made by humble farmers with as little intervention as possible, fine-wine labels still try to keep their experiments under wraps. But they are quietly deploying technology in a new way: not just to make bad wine decent, or to make good wine more cheaply, but to make already-great wines greater still.

and

France is the undisputed global leader in wine technology. As Mr Merritt notes, the country has a greater demand for mechanisation than America because its agricultural wages are higher. And France’s reputation means that its elite winemakers, unlike those in other countries, do not have to worry about criticism from elite French winemakers.

The whole thing is interesting: technologies discussed relate to automated picking (and selecting for grapes for optimal quality), new bottle closures (that work better than the old cork), reverse osmosis technologies (that improve flavor and control excess alcohol content), forgery-proof wines, precision irrigation technologies, flavor enhancing chemistry, and many others.   

It will be interesting to see if preferences for better taste and lower cost trump nostalgia.  Regarding one of the new technologies, the article conveyed:

WineSecrets, a firm in California, even lets clients try the same wine at a host of different alcohol levels to see which one tastes best. “Winemakers can’t be honest about what they do, because they’ll be accused of manipulation,” says Clark Smith, an American consultant credited with popularising RO. “When winemakers hear ‘manipulation’, they think, ‘What, you don’t want me to pick the fruit or crush the grapes?’ They’re forced to dissemble or they get demonised.”

When Is Reliance on Voluntary Approaches in Agriculture Likely to Be Effective?

That's the title of a paper by Kathleen Segerson recently published in the Applied Economics Perspectives and Policy.  Although I think she under-estimates the power of factors like reputation and over-estimates the ability of government solutions to efficiently coordinate actions, she offers a useful discussion that we ought to have more often.  The abstract:

Voluntary approaches have been used in a variety of contexts and for a variety of purposes in agriculture, including voluntary conservation programs and product labeling. This paper provides an overview of some of the general principles that emerge from the literature on voluntary approaches and their application in agriculture. The literature suggests that, to be effective, voluntary approaches must provide sufficiently strong participation incentives to a targeted population, clearly identify standards for behavior or performance that ensure additionality and avoid slippage, and monitor outcomes. Thus, reliance on voluntary approaches in agriculture is likely to be effective only if there is sufficient market demand for certain product characteristics, significant public funds are committed to pay for voluntary actions, or the political will exists to impose regulations if voluntary approaches fail.

 

Distinguishing beliefs from preferences in food choice

That's the title of a paper I co-authored with Glynn Tonsor and Ted Schroeder, which is forthcoming in the European Review of Agricultural Economics.  The abstract:

In the past two decades, there has been an explosion of studies eliciting consumer willingness-to-pay for food attributes; however, this work has largely refrained from drawing a distinction between preferences for health, safety and quality on the one hand and consumers' subjective beliefs that the products studied possess these attributes, on the other. Using data from three experimental studies, along with structural economic models, we show that controlling for subjective beliefs can substantively alter the interpretation of results and the ultimate implications derived from a study. The results suggest the need to measure subjective beliefs in studies of consumer choice and to utilise the measures when making policy and marketing recommendations.

We show applications related to tenderness, added growth hormones in beef, and country of origin labeling.  Here are a couple excerpts:

The reason why the conventional ‘reduced form’ model yields a potentially misleading result is that it does not take into account the fact that most people believe that the generic steak is safe. The reason the premium for natural over generic was so low in the ‘reduced form’ model was not because people did not care about safety but rather because they, on average, believed the health risks from growth hormones and antibiotics in the generic steak were low.

and

the results reveal that, at the mean beliefs, consumers are WTP a premium of only about USD 1.68 . . . for a US origin steak relative to the ‘weighted average origin’ steak. The reason why the value is so low is that most people believe the unlabelled steak is highly likely to come from US origin.

The estimates allow us to make interesting calculations like:

of the total WTP premium for guaranteed tender steak, 46 per cent is due to perceived value of added tenderness; the remaining 54 per cent is due to other factors. A similar computation reveals that of the total WTP premium for natural steak over the generic steak, only 38 per cent is due to perceived added healthiness or no hormone use; the remaining 62 per cent is due to other factors.

and

The implication is that when a product has a mixed-origin label, people are
apparently pessimistic, believing the joint-labelled product to have a much
higher likelihood of coming from the less-preferred origin.