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The Future for GMO Foods

On a number of occasions, I've been asked questions like, "What will it take for consumers to become accepting of GMO foods?"  My guess is that we probably aren't going to see much movement resulting from new information or new communication strategies, but rather I suspect a bigger catalyst may be the technology itself.  When scientists produce a product people really want, consumers probably won't care whether it's labeled and they'll overlook whatever small perceived risks are present.  

A while back when writing about the duplicity of a many food companies on the issue of GMO labeling, I wrote

For now, food companies are not required to add labels indicating the presence of genetically engineered ingredients. But, it might ultimately be in their best interest to do it voluntarily, and in a way that avoids the negative connotations implied by the labels that would have been mandated in state ballot initiatives.

Some day in the near future, after concerted efforts to educate the public and create consumer-oriented biotechnologies, we may see food companies clamoring to voluntarily add a label that proclaims: proudly made with biotechnology.

I've been reading Dan Charles's 2001 book Lords of the Harvest.  While I could quibble with some of the book's tone and framing of the issues, overall it is an educational and fascinating historical account of the emergence of biotech crops, including many first-hand interviews with the key players (many of whom are still active today).  

Writing about a new genetically engineered tomato that had longer shelf life and better processing characteristics that preserved taste, Charles includes a passage that indicates how GMOs might have evolved  differently (and might still evolve differently) in the public perception.  He writes the following about activities circa 1996:

Best and his colleagues at Zeneca Plant Sciences had spent an enormous amount of time cultivating British journalists and lining up partners in the food business. They’d already decided that this tomato paste would be packaged in special cans and labeled as the product of ‘genetically altered tomatoes,” even though such labels weren’t required. Two large supermarket chains, Sainsbury and Safeway, agreed to carry the product and promote it. They even turned genetic engineering into a marketing gimmick, advertising the launch of the tomato paste as ‘a world-first opportunity to taste the future.’

The Zeneca tomato paste was in fact purely an experiment in marketing. The tomatoes were grown during a single summer in California and processed using conventional methods, then packaged and flown to Europe. As a consequence, the genetically engineered paste actually cost more to produce than conventional tomato paste and tasted exactly the same. Yet Zeneca and its partners decided to charge less than the going rate for it. They were willing to take a financial loss just to find out if the British public would buy a genetically engineered product.

The answer turned out to be an unequivocal ‘yes.’ Through the summer of 1996 Zeneca’s red cans of tomato paste, proudly labeled ‘genetically altered,’ outsold all competitors.

‘You need to give the consumer a choice,’ says Best. ‘Once they had that choice, eaten it for a couple of years, found that there was no big deal, I think the whole thing would have gone away.’

So, what happened?  A confluence of events.  Mad Cow was soon discovered in Britain, which heightened food fears and undermined food regulatory agencies (who'd previously promised it was safe to eat beef).  Charles seems to blame Monsanto who he argues focused more on gaining regulatory approval than on charting a path that would engage the public on the issue. In several spots in the book, Charles talks about how Best, and Salquist with Calgene in the US,  masterfully shaped public acceptance for their tomatoes products before bringing them to market.   

 But, as I see it, it was also the technology itself.  While farmers could clearly see the benefits of herbicide-resistant and Bt crops, and they quickly snatched them up in every location where they were allowed, consumers couldn't and still can't.  Fast forward 20 years, and while "GMOs" have become a lighting rod and a proxy-fight for all sorts of agricultural issues,  the underlying reality of "who is  perceived to benefit" still hasn't changed.   I think the anti-biotech crowd knows this because they've fought hard to keep some of the most promising consumer-oriented products from the market.  

So, what will it take to change consumer acceptance of GMOs?  New companies with new products who want to sell and tout the use of biotechnology rather than hide it.  One of the implicit lessons of Charles's book is that companies who seem dominant and powerful today are often upended by entrepreneurs with a new products and a new vision for the future.  My bet is that the same forces will eventually end our current and long-standing quagmire related to public perceptions of GMO foods.  

Is ag econ academic research cited? Yes

In an editorial in the Washington Post last week, Steven Pearstein discusses the cost of higher education.  One of the comments that has drawn a lot of criticism is his claim about how much academic work goes uncited.  Pearstein writes: 

The number of journal articles published has climbed from 13,000 50 years ago to 72,000 today, even as overall readership has declined. In his new book “Higher Education in America,” former Harvard president Derek Bok notes that 98 percent of articles published in the arts and humanities are never cited by another researcher. In social sciences, it is 75 percent. Even in the hard sciences, where 25 percent of articles are never cited, the average number of citations is between one and two.

That claim has been widely retweeted - and criticized (e.g., see here or here or here).  

Well, what about research by agricultural economists?  I actually wrote a paper on this topic with Tia Hilmer that was published back in 2009.  Here's an excerpt:

Overall, the frequency of “dry holes” [or uncited papers] for the AJAE [American Journal of Agricultural Economics] is much lower than the figure of 26% for general economics journals reported by Laband and Tollison (2003). The percentage of papers receiving exactly zero citations to date is only 5.5% in 1991, 2.2% in 1993, 10.6% in 2001, 9% in 2003, and 45% in 2005. Clearly the AJAE performs much better than the average journal in Laband and Tollison’s (2003) sample of over 91 journals in terms of publishing research that is ultimately cited. Of further note is that a relatively large frequency of papers (over 20%) from the 1991 and 1993 publication years have received 20 or more citations. Although only about 10% of papers published in 2001 and 2003 have attained this level of citations, if the same trend continues we would expect the figure to double over the next decade. The RAE [Review of Agricultural Economics] experiences a higher level of “dry holes”– 32% in 2003 and 67% in 2005. The most cited paper published by the RAE in 2003 has received 11 citations to date. By contrast, the most cited paper published by the AJAE in 2003 has received 32 citations to date.

I can't speak for other disciplines, but at least for agricultural economics, the "75% is never cited" claim is clearly at odds with the facts.  Rather, given enough time, nearly ALL the papers published in our top journal - the AJAE - is eventually read and cited by someone.  

Unnatural Food

My forthcoming book Unnaturally Delicious is set for release in March.  So far, the most common questions have been, "why did you pick that title?" and "is it a book about GMOs?"  The questions stem from a food culture that has elevated the status of "natural" food to such a point that it seems odd to pair a positive connotation with the word unnatural.  There is, in my assessment, a vast under-appreciation for all the unnatural ways our food has changed over time (and I'm not talking about GMOs - I only lightly touch on this issue in a couple chapters of the book - hopefully in ways people haven't thought about before).  

These thoughts came to mind when I stumbled upon  this 2011 paper by Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.  They discuss the evolution of the potato and the impacts of this crop as it moved from the New World to the Old.  Many of us think of "Irish Potatoes" or Britian's "Bangers and Mash" as if they were the most natural foods these folks could have every eaten.  The historical reality, of course, is that potatoes are were "unnatural" foods introduced to Europe only a few hundred years ago.  

The authors begin the paper:

Between 1000 and 1900, world population grew from under 300 million to 1.6 billion, and the share of population living in urban areas more than quadrupled, increasing from two to over nine percent.

Nunn and Qian make a compelling case that a significant explanatory factor for this change was none other than the spud.  They write:

According to our most conservative estimates, the introduction of the potato accounts for approximately one-quarter of the growth in Old World population and urbanization between 1700 and 1900

How?

Potatoes provide more calories, vitamins, and nutrients per area of land sown than other staple crops

Maybe you think the world is too crowded already, and that this change is a curse rather than a blessing.  Another way to look at it: there is a reasonable chance some of the people reading this very blog wouldn't be here right now had the potato stayed local and not spread out from South America.  

The paper makes the case that the potato, along with other items that made up the  Columbian Exchange, is a significant factor contributing to the rise in European living standards in the 16th and 17th centuries.  The paper shows that regions that first adopted the potato, and had soils and climates more suitable for potato growing, experienced more rapid population growth, and thus the potato possibly affected national and international politics of the time.  The whole paper is full of interesting historical details.  For example, looking at the height of soldiers in France, the authors find:  

for towns that were fully suitable for potato cultivation, the introduction of the potato increased average adult height by 0.41–0.78 inches.

However natural potatoes might now seem, it is important to keep in mind there was a time when they weren't.  And, we're better off today because our ancestors took a chance on the unnatural foodstuff.   

Impacts of Agricultural Research and Extension

About a month ago, I posted on some new research suggesting decline rates of productivity growth in agriculture.  Last week at a conference in Amsterdam, I ran into Wally Huffman from Iowa State University, and knowing he's done work in this area, I asked him if he had any thoughts on the issue.  As it turns out, along with Yu Jin he has a new paper forthcoming in the journal Agricultural Economics on agricultural productivity and the impacts of state and federal spending on agricultural research and extension.  

Jin and Huffman also find evidence of a slowdown in productivity growth, writing: 

We find a strong impact of trended factors on state agricultural productivity of 1.1 percent per year. The most likely reason is continued strong growth in private agricultural R&D investments. The size and strength of this trend makes it unlikely for average annual TFP growth for the U.S. as a whole to become negative in the near future. However, for two-thirds of the states, the forecast of the mean ln(TFP) over 2004-2010 is less than trend. The primary reason is under-investment in public agricultural research and extension in the past. For public agricultural research where the lags are long, it will be impossible for these states to exceed the trend rate of growth for TFP in the near future.

They also find large returns to spending on agricultural research, and even larger returns to spending on extension.  They find the following:

For public agricultural research with a productivity focus the estimated real [internal rate of return] is 67%, and for narrowly defined agricultural and natural resource extension is over 100%. Stated another way, these public investment project could pay a very high interest rate (66% for agricultural research and 100% for extension) and still have a positive net present value. Hence, these [internal rate of return] estimates are quite large relative to alternative public investments in programs of education and health. In addition, there is no evidence of a low returns to public agricultural extension in the U.S., or that public funds should be shifted from public agricultural extension to agricultural research. In fact, if any shifting were to be recommended, it would be to shift some funds from public agricultural research to extension.

The paper includes a couple really interesting graphs on research spending and extension employment over time.  First, they show that for four major agricultural states, real spending on agricultural research peaked in the mid 1990s. 

And, while extension staff has declined in some states, it hasn't in others.