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The Ebbs and Flows of Fashionable Food

A recent article in Forbes ran under the headline “Regenerative Agriculture: The Next Trend In Food Retailing.” It appears regenerative is a trend that is taking a while to get going. Here is my comment on an article in the New York Times from almost exactly one year ago today.

As shown in the figure below - taken from a presentation I gave about a month ago - Time Magazine had a cover image that said “Forget Organic. Eat Local” back on 2007. We subsequently seemed to move from local to sustainable. Now it’s regenerative. Next, it will be something else.

What causes the rise and fall, or rather the rise and plateau, of various food marketing claims?

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None of these movements would have any traction if there wasn’t at least some underlying demand from consumers and investors for lowering the environmental impacts of food production, improving our health, giving farm animals a desirable life, or improving incomes of small farmers. That these base concerns exist provides the context for new movements to make their case for a place on dinner plates. Given that background context, upswings of food movements are driven the following factors.

  • Desire for authenticity and trustworthiness,

  • Myth making and seeking (“silver bullet” solutions that solve all the food system ills - environment, health, food security, and otherwise - seem particularly persuasive),

  • Romanticism of the small and natural,

  • Status-seeking (food as fashion), and

  • A core of committee devotees who are able to garner institutional support for the movement.

At some point, these movements lose their luster and become blasé. It’s not that the movement “dies” (e.g., organic food still appears to be experiencing strong sales growth), but rather the movements eventually lose their moral force and cultural cache. Why?

Here are a few thoughts.

  • As a movement grows, there is a need for standardization. What, exactly, is “local”? Food grown in your same state? Or region? Within 100 miles? Or 50 miles? What is “regenerative”? I still don’t know the answer to the last one. In the case of organic, competing definitions and conflicting standards ultimately led to U.S. federal standards and a certification program in 2002. While certification helps improve transparency and consumer communication, choices made in the process can alienate “true believers.” Consider, for example, the contentious issue of whether hydroponic crops can obtain an organic certification. Whatever decision the USDA made on that question (and countless others) was going to create winners and losers, with some people arguing that the movement has lost it’s way to gain mainstream appeal.

  • Corporatization and greenwashing. When these movements are small and growing and attracting consumers, the profits generated attract new entrants and competition, which eventually include “Big Food” and “Big Ag.” Large players can bring new knowledge, economies of scale, and open marketing channels, which helps bring down cost and helps the movement grow. However, many of these food movements are premised on the appeal to “natural” and “small,” and in many ways the movement ideology is often antithetical to scale. The very things that need to happen to mainstream a movement undermine credibility among a certain set of movement promoters.

  • Science evolves. When a movement is new and undefined, as “regenerative” is at the moment, it is easy to attach to it all of one’s hopes and dreams of food system reform. But, as the movement becomes more defined and standardized, scientists begin to conduct studies and find that the world is complex and nuanced. Studies find, for example, that organic food isn’t substantively more nutritious than conventionally produced food; and, that while organic uses fewer synthetic pesticides it also has lower yields and thus requires more land to produce the same amount of food. Studies find that localness of food has little relationship with greenhouse gas emissions. And so on. A movement loses some of its luster when it isn’t a silver bullet.

  • Mainstreaming removes prestige. When everyone can have organic food, it is no longer cool to eat organic food. Part of the appeal of high-end fashion, in both clothes and food, is exclusivity. The high price point helps these products maintain their position as status symbols, but as standardization, corporatization, competition, and scale economies come about, prices often fall. For some people, and for some goods, this can lead to a type of Veblen Good Effect, where demand falls as prices fall because the good loses its position as a status symbol.

It’s unlikely we’ll ever reach a point where there aren’t ebbs and flows in sustainability-related food trends, but there may be some ways to potentially partially step off the treadmill. One possibility is to move toward more outcome-oriented and objective (rather than process-focused, subjective) sustainability labels. That said, the advent of nutrition fact panels seems to have done little to stop the cycle of dietary-related fads and trends from low fat to low carb to high protein to gluten free to plant based. Maybe these ebbs and flows are just a part of human nature.

Inflation Impacts on Premium Food Products

With the latest data coming out today from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on inflation, there is likely to be continued discussion about rising cost of food. The latest data show a 2.6% year-over-year (i.e., July 2020 to July 2021) increase in the price of food at home and a 4.6% year-over-year increase in the price of food away from home. These figures aren’t crazy high but they are higher than what we have come to expect in the past decade. For example, average year-over-year increase each July from 2009 to 2019 (i.e., the decade preceding the pandemic) for food at home was 1.04% and for food away from home was 2.54%.

In engagements in recent months with some food brands and agri-food investment groups, I’ve been asked my thoughts about whether demand for “premium” or “niche” products might be more or less affected by inflationary factors.

One way to think about this is the elasticity of demand, which tell us how the quantity (Q) that consumers want to buy varies with a change in the product’s price (P). The basic formula for a product’s demand elasticity is given below:

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This formula tells us how much the quantity demanded will change (in percentage terms) with a 1% change in the product price. The term, ΔQ/ΔP, is the slope of the demand curve. It’s hard to outline any general rule for how this slope varies for conventional vs. “premium” products. However, the later term, price divided by quantity (P/Q), is almost certainly higher for premium than conventional products. By definition, premium products have a higher price and it is typically case that premium products have smaller sales (a smaller Q) than conventional products. Thus, there is reason to believe, based on the formula above, that “premium” products and brands will have larger demand elasticities - i.e., they will be more price elastic than conventional non-premium products. This would mean that a 1% change in a “premium” product’s price will cause a greater percentage change in the quantity of the “premium” product demanded than would be the case for conventional products.

So, what does the data say? There are a million “premium” products, but let’s look at a few examples. A study I conducted a few years ago estimated demand elasticities for organic and cage free eggs vs. conventional eggs using grocery store scanner data. The demand elasticities for cage free, organic, and conventional (in Dallas) were -2.99, -1.52, and -1. Thus, as suggested above, the premium egg products are more price sensitive (at least in percentage terms) than the conventional. As another example, consider this study by Dhar and Foltz on milk demand, which also used grocery scanner data. They found own-price demand elasticities of -4.4, -1.4, and -1 for non-rBST, organic, and conventional milk. Again, the premium milk products are more price sensitive (in percentage terms) than the conventional. Another example is this paper by Lin et al., which shows demand elasticities for organic apples, bananas, and grapes are -1.1, -3.2, and -3.5 whereas for elasticities for conventional apples, bananas, and grapes are -0.83, -0.7, and -0.49, respectively. In all these examples, the “premium” products are more price sensitive than the conventional products.

The above discussion would suggest that inflationary factors related to increased costs of labor, energy, or packaging, that push up retail prices will have a bigger impact on sales of premium products. That being said, keep in mind that a 1% change in the price of a premium product is a much larger absolute price change than a 1% change in the price of conventional product.

For example, suppose organic eggs sell for $3/dozen whereas conventional eggs sell for $1.5/dozen. Suppose higher costs of packaging mean each carton is now $0.25 more expensive. If this cost is fully passed on to the retail price, this would imply a (0.25/3)*100 = 8.3% increase in the price of organic but a (0.25/1.5)*100 = 16.7% increase in price of conventional. So, a fixed per-unit increase in cost will have a bigger percentage impact on conventional products than premium ones.

Even if own-price elasticities of demand are larger in absolute value for premium products, increased production, processing, and transportation costs are likely to represent a smaller percent of the retail price for premium than conventional products. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that conventional and premium products are demand substitutes. A phenomenon dubbed the Alchain-Allen or “ship out the good apples” effect comes into play. Wikipedia explains it as follows:

when the prices of two substitute goods, such as high and low grades of the same product, are both increased by a fixed per-unit amount such as a transportation cost or a lump-sum tax, consumption will shift toward the higher-grade product. This is because the added per-unit amount decreases the relative price of the higher-grade product.

In sum, it’s hard to know whether premium products are more or less affected by inflationary factors than conventional products. Premium products might be expected to be more demand elastic; however, if costs are increasing in a way that increases per-unit costs by a fixed amount, this will have a higher relative impact on conventional products. How’s that for economic “on the one hand … on the other hand” answer?

Testimony before the US House of Representatives

Earlier today I testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee. The topic was "State of the Beef Supply Chain: Shocks, Recovery, and Rebuilding." Links to hearing and written testimonies of the four witnesses can be found here.

My written testimony is reproduced below (or, if it’s easier to read, in this pdf).

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Chairman Costa, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. I am a food and agricultural economist and I serve as Distinguished Professor and Head of the Agricultural Economics Department at Purdue University.

I will begin by providing some background on some of the economic factors that have contributed to the volatility in cattle and beef markets in recent years. Then, I will shift my focus to three economic issues currently facing the beef cattle industry: packing capacity and resiliency, price discovery, and the importance of trade and innovation.

For the past couple years, beef and cattle markets have been extraordinarily turbulent and volatile. Major events include the loss of a major packing plant to fire in 2019, demand-induced disruptions from COVID-19 resulting from the decline in restaurant spending and the spike in grocery spending, supply-induced disruption from COVID-19 resulting from the worker illnesses in packing plants, increasing feed prices, drought in the West, and recently, increased Chinese imports and cyber-attacks. Only one other year in the past 30 has witnessed more volatility in live fed cattle prices than 2020. Consumers likewise experienced significant price shocks. Retail beef prices increased 25% year-over-year price in June 2020 before falling 3% year-over-year in May 2021.

When trying to understand the current challenges, some historical perspective is warranted. Over the past decade, cattle inventories have followed a V-shaped pattern. Corresponding cattle prices have followed an inverse V-shaped pattern. From 2010 to 2015, total number of commercial cattle slaughtered fell by more than 16%. The decline resulted from producers cutting inventory as a result of a dramatic increase in feed prices and a drought in some parts of the Midwest. The change in cattle numbers affected the packing sector. There was, at the time, too much packing capacity relative to the number of cattle, and returns to cattle processing took a hit. Some small and medium packers exited because it was no longer profitable, and some large packers shuddered plants in an attempt to align capacity with inventory.

The high levels of capacity relative to cattle numbers, coupled with strong demand, led to a rise in cattle prices. Following a common cyclical pattern (the “cattle cycle”), producers retained heifers and expanded their herds to capture the benefits of higher prices that were experienced in 2014 and 2015. By 2019, total commercial cattle slaughter had increased 16.7% relative to the 2015 low. The packing sector, having adjusted to a smaller herd size, now found itself in the opposite position: there was a high number of cattle relative to processing capacity, which put downward pressure on cattle prices. It was against this backdrop that we experienced the unexpected fire, pandemic, and cyber-attack that further exacerbated the effects of limited capacity. If these unexpected events had occurred in 2014 or 2015, the impacts on producers would have been much different.

There is a key lesson to take from this recent historical episode. There are long lags and ripple effects in cattle and beef markets. A producer makes a decision today to breed a cow, and it will be roughly three years till the resulting offspring is ready for market. Likewise, investors today decide to build a new packing plant. It will be years before construction is finished and the capacity is brought online. Everyone is betting on the future with information that ultimately be two to three years old by the time outcomes are realized. Cattle inventories have already started to fall, and cattle prices have risen since last summer. My recommendation to you, as policy makers, is the following: do not overly focus on what is happening today. Consider what will be needed 3 to 5 years from now. Market participants adapt to changing circumstances, although sometimes more slowly than we’d like because of biological and construction lags, but policy ideally should focus on longer-run forces that improve the well-being of producers and consumers in an industry.

With that backdrop, I will move on to the first of three current issues facing the industry. There are a number of state and federal initiatives to increase processing capacity. As previously, noted, processing capacity in 2020, even if the pandemic hadn’t occurred, was likely to be “tight,” which contributed to downward pressure on cattle prices. We appear, however, to be in a different phase of the cattle cycle. Cattle inventory is falling. Feed prices are rising. There is a drought in West. These factors will, over time, likely bring cattle numbers closer in line with current capacity. Moreover, even absent federal investments, there are a number of private initiatives to increase automation and add more packing capacity. More capacity, and fewer cattle, will help support future cattle prices. But, as the experience of the past decade has revealed, that will not be the end of the story. Whether we are setting ourselves up, in five years' time, for another situation in the packing sector like the one experienced in 2014 and 2015 remains to be seen. Additional government investments in capacity, for the purpose of improving cattle prices, may be fixing yesterday’s problem.

There is another argument being made for adding capacity: improving resiliency to the sector. Extra capacity could be seen as a form of insurance against unexpected capacity reductions from events like fire, pandemic, or cyber-attack. COVID-19 infections led to and dramatic reduction the nation’s beef slaughter capacity. There was little excess capacity in the system and nowhere for market-ready cattle to go. My research with Purdue colleague Meilin Ma indicates that even if we would have had a more distributed packing sector consisting of more small and medium sized plants instead of a small number of large plants, the price spread dynamics and beef supply disruptions would not have likely have been appreciably different than what we witnessed. The problem at the time was not the size or localness of the plants but total industry capacity.

However, excess capacity is expensive, and it is in no individual packer’s interest to routinely operate at significantly reduced capacity. Imagine approaching an investor asking for tens of millions of dollars with a plan to only operate a facility at only 50% capacity. Few bankers would agree to such a deal. Support for subsidizing additional processing capacity might be justified on public insurance grounds, but ultimately, the ebbs and flows of the cattle cycle will determine the long-run size of the packing industry, and newly subsidized plants will be at an advantage over older existing plants when cattle numbers come back in line with capacity and ultimate profitability determines the size of the packing sector. Support for small and local processors might benefit local economic ecosystems and increase custom harvest operations for producers, but these operations, because they lack economies of scale, must focus on quality and service to be competitive, and are such a small part of the national industry that investments at this size are unlikely to significantly alter the aggregate industry capacity. It is also worth noting that costs of adding packing capacity are not limited to concrete and iron. I encourage you to consider other costs and barriers that limit new entrants thus expanded capacity. Availability of labor has been a significant challenge for the industry and labor constraints put a limit on processing capacity. Other factors include the costs of complying with federal, state, and local regulations related to labor, food safety, zoning, transportation, and more.

Second, in light of the relatively low cattle prices experienced in 2020, there have been a number of proposals to affect the marketing of cattle. One set of concerns has focused on the share of cattle sold on a negotiated or cash basis. While the share of cattle sold in this manner, roughly 20%, has not changed much since the high-cattle-price era experienced in 2014 and 2015, it is lower than was the case a decade ago. Cattle sold on a formula basis often utilize the negotiated, cash price as a base. Thus, trades on a relatively small number of cattle influence the price for a much larger number of formula-priced cattle. A concern has emerged as to whether there are enough trades in the cash market to truly reflect market fundamentals. In efforts to improve price discovery, an important distinction needs to be made: price levels and price volatility. Even if all cattle were traded on a negotiated, cash basis, the price level would not necessarily improve; however, we might be more confident that any given transaction would be reflective of the “true” underlying supply and demand conditions at the time and location. Whether, in fact, there are too few cash transactions to reflect market fundamentals is debatable.

Attempting to mandate more cattle be sold in a negotiated, cash basis has potential benefits and certain costs. The fact that most producers and packers choose to sell cattle using alternative marketing arrangements suggests they see benefits in this form of marketing in the form of increased certainty, lower transactions costs, and supply chain coordination. Mandating a certain percent of cattle be sold on a negotiated basis would entail some producers and packers foregoing a marketing method they currently find more desirable. That is a cost. Moreover, strengthening of consumer demand for beef over the past couple decades has occurred over a period in which there was increased use of formula pricing that rewarded quality improvements. Eroding the ability of consumers, retailers, and packers to incentivize quality through formulas and vertical coordination may have detrimental impacts on demand.

The best economic case for mandating more negotiated transactions rests on the argument that price discovery is a public good. Are there less costly ways to improve price discovery than a mandate? Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is one tool that has improved price transparency and discovery. Continued research into improvements in this legislation might further facilitate price discovery. Taxes to avoid, or subsidies to use, negotiated cash markets are seldom mentioned despite having similar economic intuition as a mandate. Even if a mandate were pursued, it might be made more efficient if coupled with a “cap and trade” system, where obligations to secure cattle in a cash market might be bought and sold in a secondary “offset” market similar to what currently exists for fuel manufactures mandated to blend a given amount of biofuels. Including negotiated grid or formula transactions in a mandate would also lessen the costs of the policy. It is important to consider solutions that may be less costly and restrictive than a mandate because the cattle industry is constantly evolving and needs to remain cost-competitive with other animal- and plant-proteins to have a place on consumers’ dinner plates.

I will conclude with an encouragement to focus on policies that improve the health of the entire industry. Discussions of cattle prices and packing capacity can give the impression that beef and cattle markets represent a zero-sum game. But, one party’s gain does not have to come at the expense of another. What policies increase the size of the pie available to all participants: cow-calf producers, backgrounders, feedlots, packers, retailers, and ultimately, consumers?

As witnessed in recent months, improved trade relations have the ability improve economic circumstances for multiple segments of the industry. The U.S. exports about 12% of beef production. Trade agreements are important to help open markets for U.S. producers to allow products to flow to consumers who value them most.

Investments in research and innovation that increase demand or improve productivity are likely a net win for consumers, producers, and the environment. Had we not innovated since 1970, about 11 million more feedlot cattle would have been needed to produce the amount of beef U.S. consumers actually enjoyed last year. Innovation and technology saved the extra land, water, and feed that these cattle would have required, as well as the waste and greenhouse gases that they would have emitted. Investments in research to improve the productivity of livestock and poultry can improve producer profitability, consumer affordability, and the sustainability for food supply chain.

Despite the challenges of the past couple years, the beef cattle system responded remarkably well to a series of large, unexpected disruptions. Producer prices have been on the rise. Consumer demand is strong. These core facts should remain front of mind when considering changes that would significantly affect the cattle industry going forward.

Price Discovery in Cattle Markets

With the change in administration and controversies still swirling around the COVID-related market disruptions, there are many active conversations and policy proposals focused on concentration and pricing in cattle markets. Many of my colleagues have had smart things to say on these topics. To mention just a few, check out the recent hearing of the U.S. Senate Ag Committee featuring testimony by Glynn Tonsor, Mary Hendrickson, Dustin Aherin, Mark Gardiner, and Justin Tupper, or see this piece by economists Derrell Peel, David Anderson, John Anderson, Chris Bastian, Scott Brown, Steve Koontz, and Josh Maples, or some previous writing by Koontz.

One of the main issues being debated is that, over time, fewer fed cattle are being sold in the cash or spot market. Rather, cattle are increasingly sold via various formulas or contracts. The rub is that most of the contracts use the cash market price as base to which premiums and discounts are add or subtracted. That is, a relatively small percentage of trades are determining the price for a relatively large number of cattle. Are there “enough” transactions in the spot, cash market to truly reflect market fundamentals and facilitate price discovery (and some have argued, to prevent “market manipulation” by any one party)? This is actually an old problem facing agriculture as concentration and consolidation has occured. For example, Bill Tomek has a seminal paper from 1980 on thin markets entitled “Price Behavior on a Declining Terminal Market.”

Some of the current policy proposals involve a mandate or requirement that packers buy a certain percentage of their cattle in the spot market. This approach would, presumably, improve price discovery. However, it comes at a cost. Many of the current contracts reward beef quality. Might quality, and thus consumer demand, fall if such incentives were eroded? More fundamentally, it can be noted that the increasing trend away from cash markets reflects voluntary choices on the part of producers and packers, who both presumably see some benefit in pursing alternative marketing arrangements relative to the cash market. Mandating a certain percent of trades occur on the cash market would require some producers to sell in the cash market who presumably would have preferred to sell by contract or formula. That’s a cost.

That said, there could also be benefits from more cash trades. Those benefits might be thought of as a type of public good because, as pointed out in some of the aforementioned testimony and writings, improved price discovery doesn’t necessarily mean higher prices for producers. Rather, it means that any given trade is likely to be more reflective of market fundamentals vs. “noise” or other idiosyncrasies (see the Tomek article for a deeper treatment of the issue).

So, there are benefits and costs to mandating more cattle be sold in the cash market. You can click on the aforementioned links to see for yourself where most of the economists wind up on this issue. My point here isn’t to weigh in on that topic per se. One role of academics, advocated most effectively in Roger Pielke Jr’s book The Honest Broker is to try to expand the opportunity set of ideas.

If the goal is to increase price discovery, are there more efficient ways to do that than mandate a certain percentage of cattle be sold on the spot market? Or, are there ways to make a mandatory cap less costly on the system?

A few thoughts (other, related ideas, have been offered by many of the folks I linked to previously).

A mandate might be made more efficient if accompanied with a "cap and trade" system. If each packing plant must buy a certain percent of cattle on the cash market, a secondary market could be created for this federally assigned "obligation to buy cattle." Each packer would have a mandated obligation to buy a certain number of cattle in a certain amount of time. They can either fulfill that obligation by buying cattle OR by buying “offsets” from another packer or entity. These offsets essentially transfer the obligation to buy cattle in the spot market from another packer to another packer (or another entity).

Prices in this secondary “offset” market would reflect the cost of requiring additional cash transactions. More importantly, this approach would ensure that those cattle being bought and sold on the cash market are those most efficiently sold in that manner. While perhaps a bit crazy, there are active secondary markets like this for fuel, where refineries are federally required to buy and blend a certain amount of biofuels (see this explanation of RINs), and there are similar schemes to mitigate pollution in the most cost-effective way (see this piece about SO2 cap-and-trade).

The futures market is another area where price discovery for cattle occurs, and even in the absence of many cash trades, the futures price is relevant particularly given that live cattle futures contracts can be settled with physical delivery of cattle. If futures markets are also "too thin," why not have the mandate act on the futures price rather the physical animals per se? That might reduce transactions cost.

If the issue of price discovery is really a public-good issue, there is a very large economics literature on these topics. From a purely technocratic standpoint, one way to discourage free-riding is to tax the behavior (in this case, it would mean a tax on transactions not in the cash market). Or, one might subsidize sales in the cash market (how are the subsidies funded?). How would the efficiencies of these tax and subsidy policies compare to a mandate?

Or, perhaps we academics can take a page out of Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom’s book, and sit back and see what norms and practices emerge to help solve this particular tragedy of the commons.

Two Blades of Grass: The Impact of the Green Revolution

That’s the title of a paper by Douglas Gollin, Casper Hansen, and Asger Wingender just published in the Journal of Political Economy (an earlier ungated version is here). It’s unusual to find a paper focused on a core agricultural and farming question published in one of the top general interest economics journals, but I suspect the magnitude of the effects are so large, it’s hard to ignore. Here’s the abstract:

We estimate the impact of the Green Revolution in the developing world by exploiting exogenous heterogeneity in the timing and extent of the benefits derived from high-yielding crop varieties (HYVs). We find that HYVs increased yields by 44% between 1965 and 2010, with further gains coming through reallocation of inputs. Higher yields increased income and reduced population growth. A 10-year delay of the Green Revolution would in 2010 have cost 17% of GDP (gross domestic product) per capita and added 223 million people to the developing-world population. The cumulative GDP loss over 45 years would have been US$83 trillion, corresponding to approximately one year of current global GDP.